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My thesis attempts to provide an aesthetic definition of art.   
 
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is a summary of the different 
attempts in defining art in contemporary analytic philosophy, beginning with a 
discussion of Morris Weitz’s famous paper “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics”, in 
which he appealed to Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” idea while rejecting 
traditional essential definitions. His attempt has led to the appearance of contemporary 
essential definitions, whereby art is defined through different relational properties. This 
is followed by a critically review on Weitz’s claims and those definitions. 
 
The second part focuses on Iseminger’s new aestheticism. I found that the notion of 
appreciation employed by Iseminger was somehow problematic, and proposed neo-
Lewisian notion of value-apprehension as a replacement, with a critical discussion of 
whether such replacement is possible. In the last part of the thesis, I considered and 
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What is art? This is one of the biggest questions that troubles philosophers. Throughout 
history, many famous philosophers have attempted to provide an answer, the earliest of 
whom was Plato. He considered art as imitation and thought that works of art are objects that 
imitate our sensual world. In his philosophy, the sensual world is defective and there is a 
perfect world that is paradigmatic for all the structure and character in the sensual world. In 
the other words, Plato differentiated between objects that appear beautiful and the true 
beauty that makes all those objects appears to be beautiful. He further claimed that people 
should pursue the perfect world. In this sense, Plato disvalued art, because art enthralls 
people with false images and obstructs people from tracing the true beauty. However, by 
providing a definition of art, Plato not only helped us to identify work of art, but also told us 
about the nature of art, and the proper way of treating and appreciating it. On the other hand, 
for contemporary philosophers, defining art has nothing to do with discovering the nature of 
art and the way of appreciating art. For instance, Stephen Davies considered a definition of 
art to be different from a theory of art. The main point of a definition of art, he claimed, is to 
identify a practically feasible condition which helps us to distinguish art from non-art 
(Davies 1991). 
 
Arguably, this line of thought follows from Morris Weitz’s famous paper “The Role of 
Theory in Aesthetics”, in which he argued that art is an open concept that is undefinable 
(Weitz 1956). Weitz’s argument, along with certain contemporary art developments, such as 
avant-garde arts, showed that the concept of art and the concept of aesthetic, which were 
considered to be closely related, are in fact seemingly differentiated. As a result, aesthetic 
definitions lose their dominating position in the academia, and other theoretical approaches, 
such as institutional definitions and historical definitions, arise in an attempt to solve Weitz's 
argument and to account for contemporary art developments. Unfortunately, all such 
attempts either are theoretically problematic or have ignored certain forms of art. Recently, 
Davies abandoned the attempt to reject Weitz’s claim and admitted that there are many ways 
of qualifying art (Davies 2012). Despite this, he still believed that art is definable with a 
disjunctive definition.  
 
Recently, there is a resurrection of the aesthetic definitions of art. For example, James C. 
Anderson proposed a refined version of aesthetic definition (Anderson 2000) constructed on 
the basis of Kendall Walton’s two-tiered structure analysis of aesthetic appreciation (Walton 
1993). Anderson disengaged the notion of aesthetic experience from the notion of pleasure, 
thereby claiming that it is theoretically possible for his refined version of aesthetic definition 
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to account for conceptually arts that afford unpleasurable experiences to audience. Gary 
Iseminger also proposed a refined version of aesthetic definition, which he termed the new 
aestheticism (Iseminger 2004). Unlike Anderson, who connected the concept of aesthetic 
with the concept of work of art, Iseminger connected the concept of aesthetic with the notion 
of the artworld, and claimed that his new aestheticism is able to circumvent the objections 
that argue against the traditional aestheticism while upholding the advantages of the 
traditional aestheticism.  
 
The current thesis aims to critically review the aesthetic definition of art under Iseminger’s 
new aestheticism in three parts. The first part starts with a summary of the different attempts 
in defining art in contemporary analytic philosophy, which began with Morris Weitz’s 
famous paper “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics”, in which he appealed to Wittgenstein’s 
notion of “family resemblance” while rejecting traditional essential definitions. His attempt 
has led to the appearance of contemporary essential definitions, which define art through 
different relational properties. This is followed by a critical review of Weitz’s argument, 
especially some of the definitions which are proposed in the attempt to defend his argument. 
 
The second part begins with a review of Iseminger’s new aestheticism. I first outlined 
Iseminger’s proposal by considering his two main theses: the functional thesis and the 
valuational thesis, and argued that one fundamental notion in the new aestheticism, namely, 
the notion of appreciation, is somehow problematic. I then proposed that the problem can be 
solved by replacing the notion of appreciation with the Lewisian notion of value-
apprehension. The remainder of this part is dedicated to an explanation of the notion of 
value-apprehension and the feasibility of my proposal.  
 
In the last part of this thesis, I attempt to defend my proposal against two types of possible 
objections. The first type argues against the Lewisian notion of value-apprehension, such as 
those by Noël Carroll (Carroll 2002b). The second type argues against my proposal itself. I 
consider various objections, for instance, the antiexperiential objection arising from the 
contemporary art developments, such as Marcel Duchamp’s “readymades”, separately, with 





Chapter 1 - Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a review of Marcel Duchamp’s 
influential work Fountain and Weitz’s open concept argument. I will explain the 
significance of Fountain and the structure of Weitz’s argument, both of which are important 
because they tend to challenge the traditional definitions of art, for instance, Clive Bell’s 
aesthetic definition, and evoke the appearance of contextual definitions. The second section 
summarizes the major contemporary approaches in defining art, and explains how these 
approaches attempt to reject Weitz’s argument in two different ways. This is followed by an 
introduction to Robert Stecker’s convergent (Stecker 2000) view on the definition of art and 
Davies’ disjunctive definition (Davies 2015). In Section 3, I will comment on how Davies’ 
disjunctive definition ignores one of the core claims in Weitz’s argument, namely, the 
creativity of art, and conclude that Davies’ definition is conceptually problematic. I will then 
propose classifying Davies’ disjunctive definition as a non-unified disjunctive definition, 
claim that any definition with non-unified disjunctive structure is conceptually problematic, 
and further argue that one of the possible ways of constructing a workable definition of art is 
to unify all disjunctive clauses with a single notion. Finally, I will illustrate my argument by 
taking Anderson’s refined version of aesthetic definition as an example of a unified 
disjunctive definition (Anderson 2000). 
 
1. Duchamp’s Fountain and Weitz’s Argument 
This part is a review of Fountain and Weitz’s view on the project of defining art. Fountain is 
an influential work that has unique status in not only the history of art, but also the history of 
philosophy of art, and it poses challenges to the traditional approach of defining art, as will 
be illustrated using Clive Bell’s definition as an example (Bell 1914). After the creation of 
Fountain, physical appearance of work of art became various and different, leading to Weitz 
reconsidering the possibility of defining art by claiming that art is an open concept because 
of the creativity of art. In the following, I will take Davie’s analysis of Weitz’s argument as a 
basic framework to sum up his points.   
 
1.1. Introduction to Fountain 
In 1917, Marcel Duchamp, a French-American artist, created an influential work of art - 
Fountain. The work is a readymade porcelain urinal that is physically indistinguishable from 
other readymade porcelain urinals. Duchamp reoriented the position of the urinal and signed 
on it.1 By doing so, he claimed that he had cancelled the ordinary function of the urinal and 
                                               
1 Duchamp wrote the name of the manufacturer of the urinal, instead of signing his own 
name on the urinal. 
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turned it into a work of art. He further claimed that he intended to shift the focus of art from 
physical craft to intellectual interpretation (Lister 2009). In other words, Duchamp desired to 
break away from the traditional art development and create a new way of treating and 
appreciating art.  
 
Fountain is a highly controversial work. Some, for instance, Beardsley, questioned whether 
it should be counted or treated as a work of art. In spite of all those controversies, Fountain 
remains influential in contemporary art development (BBC News, 1 December 2004), 
especially for the inspiration it brings to later conceptual and avant-garde works of art that 
emphasize on intellectual interpretations rather than physical crafts. Artists of conceptual and 
avant-garde art pay more attention on ideas expressed by their works and the revolutionary 
movements caused by those works. Duchamp not merely created a new way of making art, 
but also modified the role of creativity in the field of art, as the notion of creativity became 
important and began playing a central role in contemporary art development. After the 
creation of Fountain, art is not necessarily aesthetically related. Rather, it is free from the 
notion of aesthetic and becomes limitless. In this sense, the concept of art becomes an open 
concept - a concept that is always subject to unpredictable creational movement in future.  
 
1.2. Influence of Duchamp’s Fountain on the Project of Defining Art 
The creation of Fountain showed that work of art can be physically indistinguishable from 
ordinary objects. This brings a major challenge to the traditional approach of defining art. 
Before Fountain, people considered works of art as objects that are different from ordinary 
objects, with philosophers accounting for those differences in terms of various physical 
properties. Bell’s notion of “significant form” is a typical example (Bell 1914). Bell viewed 
works of art as objects that serve a certain function, namely, to evoke our aesthetic emotion, 
and the effect of evoking aesthetic emotion is due to a unique property that is shared by all 
works of art. He named this property “significant form”. The significant form emerges on 
top of the overall combination of certain physical properties of a work of art. For instance, it 
may emerge from the particular way a painter puts together all the lines, colors, and shapes 
in a painting. The significant form can also be generated from different sets of combinations. 
Thus, the appearances of works of art are various. In this sense, Bell’s definition is both 
functional and aesthetic, because he referred to and relied on the notion of aesthetic emotion 
when defining art.  
 
A problem with Bell’s definition is that it fails to account for the status of works of art like 
Fountain and other readymade works. The problem stems from the fact that the combination 
 
5 
of physical properties of those readymade works is the same as their non-art counterparts2. 
Under Bell’s definition, if Fountain possesses significant form and thus evokes aesthetic 
emotion, then all its counterparts would also possess significant form and evoke aesthetic 
emotion, because they have the same combination of physical properties. Clearly, this 
inference does not fit with the real situation, as only Fountain is able to evoke audience’s 
aesthetic emotion, but not its non-art counterparts. This shows that the status of art is not 
necessarily dependent on a work’s appearance, and that it is inadequate to attempt to define 
art by reducing the status of art to certain physical properties.  
 
1.3. Morris Weitz’s Argument 
In regard to the variety of art, some philosophers remain skeptical about the possibility of 
defining art. One such philosopher was Morris Weitz, who believed that the central duty of 
philosophers of art is not to identify the nature of art but to clarify the content of the concept 
of art. In his paper “The role of theory in aesthetic”, Weitz challenged all previous 
definitions of art as inadequate (Weitz 1956), as those definitions emphasize on only one or 
several properties of art, resulting in them being either too broad (the definitional condition 
included certain non-art objects) or too narrow (the definitional condition excluded some 
objects of art). He further claimed that the failure in defining art was not merely an 
empirical, but a conceptual one, and the traditional definitions were inadequate because 
philosophers misconstrued the concept of art as a closed concept, whereas it should be an 
open concept that is impossible to be defined with certain necessary and sufficient 
conditions.  
 
According to Davies, Weitz’s argument can be separated into two claims: the empirical 
claim and the conceptual claim (Davies 1991). I hereby suggest summing up the empirical 
claim with the notion of variety, and the conceptual claim with the notion of creativity, and 
further propose that the core claim of Weitz’s argument is not the empirical, but the 
conceptual claim.  
 
The argumentative power of empirical claim relies on the variety of works of art, which is 
embodied in two empirical facts: 1) the variety of works themselves, and 2) the variety of 
definitions of art. In illustrating the first fact, Weitz proposed that by “looking and seeing” 
                                               
2 Those non-art counterparts are perceptually indistinguishable from those readymade works. 
For instance, Fountain is a porcelain urinal that Duchamp picked in a store. Its appearance is 
similar to many other manufactured porcelain urinals. Those other porcelain urinals are 




all existing works of art (Weitz 1956), one would recognize that works of art are variable, 
and thus admit that there is no property common to all and only art. In illustrating the second 
fact, Weitz summarized all previous attempts on defining art by reviewing several 
approaches used to do so, including Formalism, Emotionalism, Intuitionism, Organicism, 
and Voluntarist, and concluded that none of these approaches is adequate for defining work 
of art, as some simply define work of art with a single property, while the more complex 
ones, though being able to define work of art with a combination of several properties of art, 
only correctly pick out certain important ones while neglecting others. However, based on 
these empirical phenomena, Weitz developed a conceptual claim for the concept of art. 
In order to explain the variety of art, Weitz proposed that the concept of art is an open, rather 
than a closed, concept. An open concept is one that cannot be defined by any jointly 
necessary and sufficient condition, that is, a true definition, though there are some necessary 
and some sufficient properties for being art (Davies 1991). Thus, traditional approaches fail 
conceptually, because they attempt to define art with a true definition of being art. This 
conceptual claim relies on the notion of creativity of art, which is also embodied in also two 
empirical facts: 1) the historical development of art, and 2) the situation of the application of 
the concept of art in daily life. 
 
The history of contemporary art development shows that radical revolution movements are 
not unusual in art creation. For instance, Fountain is a creative work that is totally different 
from all previous art. It is inappropriate to label this creativity with a true definition, as a true 
definition attempts to provide permanent conditions of the application of certain concept. In 
other words, it aims to discover the essential properties of certain objects. If art has essential 
properties, then works of art could not challenge, alter, subvert, or depart from these 
essential aspects, otherwise they will not be classified as art (Davies 1991). But the creation 
of Fountain shows that even an object that challenges and departs from all previous 
properties and traditions of art can be a work of art. Thus, the concept of art is open to those 
creative movements and there is no property that is essential to art. It follows that art should 
not be defined by a true definition, because such a definition would foreclose on future 
creativity of art (Davies 1991).  
 
To illustrate the situation of applying the concept of art in daily life, Weitz suggested one to 
consider the situation of applying the concept of art to a new object, for example Dos 
Passos’ U.S.A. When answering the question “Is Dos Passos’ U.S.A a novel”, one does not 
consider certain jointly necessary and sufficient conditions, because there are various and 
different works of art. Rather, one would consider the similarity between the new object and 
 
7 
other existing works of art. In this sense, one is actually deciding whether to extend the 
concept to include (abolishing some current conditions as necessary conditions and 
accepting new conditions as sufficient conditions) or to shrink the concept to exclude 
(abolishing some current conditions as sufficient conditions and accepting new conditions as 
necessary conditions) some new cases. For example, when applying the concept of art to 
“Driftwood art”, one excludes the artifactuality condition as necessary condition.3  
 
1.3. Deep-Seated Theoretical Concern in Morris Weitz’s Argument 
Weitz’s argument against the possibility of defining art with an essential definition, that is, 
with certain necessary and sufficient conditions, is based on a deep-seated theoretical 
concern about the philosophical theories of concepts. Theories of concept consider the nature 
of concept, which is an important field in the philosophy of mind. While such theories are 
very complicated and not the main theme of the current thesis, it is useful to briefly 
introduce some basic ideas, which will help in understanding Weitz’s argument, which is 
important in the philosophical project of defining art and the concept of art.  
 
One possible reason, or a theoretical concern, that motivated Weitz’s proposal is probably 
the failure of classical theory of concepts and the rise of prototype theory in philosophy of 
mind. According to the classical theory, concepts are “complex mental representations 
whose structure generally encodes a specification of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
their own application” (Margolis and Laurence 2007, 191). One may consider the concept of 
bachelor as an example. The concept of bachelor encodes two individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient conditions: (1) being unmarried, and (2) being a man. Someone is a 
bachelor if and only if (1) the person is unmarried, and (2) the person is a man, and this can 
be considered a definition of bachelor, drawn from the analysis of the concept of bachelor.  
 
In this regard, most, if not all, attempts on seeking an essential definition of something are a 
result of an analysis of certain concepts, including attempts on seeking an essential definition 
of art. That is, someone applies a concept to an object because the object fulfils the 
conditions that encode the concept, and a definition is supposed to specify the conditions that 
encode the concept. The domination of the classical theory of concepts, along with the 
specification of necessary and sufficient conditions encodes in the structure of our mental 
representation, has resulted in a tendency for one to seek an essential definition.  
                                               
3 One may insist that the artifactuality condition is still necessary. For instance, Dickie 
argues that one may artifactualize a price of driftwood by presenting it, say exhibiting it in 




By the 1970s, philosophers and psychologists started to criticize the classical theory as both 
philosophically and psychologically implausible. The philosophical implausibility is 
manifested in the classical theory’s poor record in identifying essential definitions, or, in 
Margolis and Laurence’s words, “sheer lack of uncontroversial examples of definitions”, that 
“in spite of more than two thousand years of intensive sustained philosophical analysis, there 
are few, if any, viable cases where a concept can be said to have been defined. In fact, the 
failures of this research program are notorious” (Margolis and Laurence 2007, 192). On the 
other hand, the psychological implausibility can be seen from the classical theory’s failure in 
predicting any of the typicality effect that appear in psychological experiments. Typicality 
effects are “a variety of psychological phenomena connected to the fact that people willingly 
rate subcategories for how typical or representative they are for a given category” (Margolis 
and Laurence 2007, 194). For instance, people tend to consider robins rather than chickens 
as a typical example of the category “bird”. Moreover, typicality effects are heavily related 
to our process of categorization, as psychologists find that independent measures of 
typicality can predict one’s speed in making correct affirmations in categorizing. 
 
The failure of the classical theory led to it losing its dominant position, and the rise of 
various alternatives (Margolis and Laurence 2007). One strong competitor is the prototype 
theory.  Prototype theory claims that “most lexical concepts are complex mental 
representations whose structure encodes not defining necessary and sufficient conditions, 
but, rather, conditions that items in their extension tend to have” (Margolis and Laurence 
2007, 195). The prototype theory “gave up on the idea that a concept’s internal structure 
provides a definition of the concept” as found in the classical theory, and “adopted a 
probabilistic treatment of conceptual structure” (Margolis and Laurence 2007, 195). An 
object needs not satisfy each and every property that encodes in the concepts’ structure in 
order for it to be in the extension of the concept. Rather, it merely needs to satisfy a 
sufficient number of them (Margolis and Laurence 2007). For instance, in order for a 
chicken to be in the extension of the concept bird, it merely needs to satisfy some properties, 
say, having toothless beaked jaws, which encode in the concept. According to the prototype 
theory, failure in constructing essential definitions and failure in proving their appearance in 
experimental situation are because of the lack of definitional structure of concept. Prototype 
theory fits with discoveries in the empirical psychological data. According to the theory, 
categorization is a feature-matching process in which “exemplar or individual is compared to 
a target category for how similar they are”, and “so long as enough features match, they are 
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deemed sufficiently similar and one comes to judge that the item falls under the category” 
(Margolis and Laurence 2007, 196).  
 
However, there are also problems with the prototype theory. Philosophers question that 
many concepts simply do not have prototypes. For instance, we may think of a prototypical 
grandmother, but not a prototypical Chauer’s grandmother. Moreover, prototype theory is 
seemingly unable to fit into the principles of a compositional semantics, as exemplified by 
the following case: “The PET prototype encodes properties that are associated with dogs and 
cats, and the FISH prototype encodes properties that are associated with things like trout, yet 
the PET FISH prototype encodes properties that are associated with goldfish and other small 
colorful fish. So it's hard to see how the prototype for PET FISH could be computed from 
the prototypes for PET and FISH” (Margolis and Laurence 2007, 197). 
 
1.4. Influence of Morris Weitz’s Empirical Claim 
Weitz’s paper has affected philosophers in various aspects. According to Davies (Davies 
1991), some philosophers, for example, William Kennick and Haig Khatchadourian, agreed 
that the concept of art is ruled by resemblance and paradigm. Other philosophers agreed that 
an essential definition will foreclose on art creativity, and concurred with Weitz’s idea that 
any attempt on providing a true definition of art is impossible. In fact, Weitz’s argument has 
posed a serious challenge to the project of defining art, because he conceptually ruled out the 
possibility of defining art. 
 
Despite this, philosophers attempt to continue the project of defining art. They argue against 
Weitz’s empirical claim by objecting the variety of art, and challenge it for 1) ignoring 
certain non-perceptual properties of art and 2) incorrectly including some non-art objects, for 
example Fountain. The first challenge stems from Weitz’s use of Wittgensteinian notion of 
“look and see” as a method of examining art, which, as certain philosophers claim, ignores 
certain aspects of work of art by overlooking certain of their non-perceptual and external 
properties. In other words, one cannot identify institutional properties of a work of art simply 
by “look and see”. Thus, works of art are not truly various, and there are some hidden 
essential properties that group them together. The second challenge is against Weitz’s 
classification of the range of art, which includes certain non-art objects as works of art. 
Monroe Beardsley claimed that a definition of art needs not account for all ordinary usage of 
the concept of art uncritically, because sometimes artists apply the concept to some outer 




These two challenges on Weitz’s empirical claim have led to two radically different 
approaches to defining art. The first approach attempts to define art through certain 
conventional properties of work of art. Similar to traditionalists, conventionalists also 
attempt to define art through certain jointly necessary and sufficient conditions, but they 
emphasize only on non-perceptual properties, because perceptual properties are variable. 
Conventionalists claim that the contextual-cultural features are explanatorily fundamental in 
defining art, and they attempt to explain the phenomena on art history, for instance, the 
traditionally close relation between art and aesthetic, and the revolutionary movement of 
modern art, by social or historical terms (Adajian 2007). Based on this, conventionalism can 
be classified into two categories, namely, historical conventionalism and institutional 
conventionalism. 
 
The second approach attempts to define art by certain functions that works of art serve. 
Davies named this approach as functionalism. The main form of functionalism is 
aestheticism. Proponents of aestheticism claim that the concept of art is connected with the 
concept of aesthetic and deny the status of art to certain alleged objects of art. They follow 
the traditional aesthetic view on defining art, but they redefine the notion of aesthetic and 
add some other conditions, for instance, intentional condition, into their definition.  
 
2. Contemporary Attempts to Define Art 
This section starts with a review of several main theories related to institutional and 
historical conventionalism, aestheticism, and Davies’ disjunctive definition of art. This is 
followed by an introduction to Stecker’s convergent view on defining art and Davies’s 
disjunctive definition, which he created by further developing Stecker’s ideas. I will show 
that, although Davies claimed that his definition is consistent with the historical development 
of art, it is in fact a conceptual failure, because it fails to account for Weitz’s conceptual 
claim about the creativity of art. 
 
2.1. Institutional Conventionalism 
The earliest version of institutional conventionalism was proposed by Arthur Danto in his 
famous paper “The artworld”, in which he introduced the notion of artworld, which is 
constituted by the changing practices and convention, the heritage of works, the intentions of 
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artists, the art criticism, etc. He claimed that a work of art gains its identity as art from the 
“atmosphere of theories” (Danto 1964).4 
 
Later, Dickie developed Danto’s ideas into a sophisticated definition. According to Dickie, 
there are five individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for defining work of 
art: 
 
“(1) an artist is a person who participates with understanding in the making of a work of art; 
(2) a work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an art world public; (3) a 
public is a set of persons the member of which are prepared in some degree to understand 
and object which is presented to them; (4) the art world is the totality of all artworld systems; 
and, (5) an artworld system is a framework for the presentation of a work of art by an artist 
to an artworld public” (Dickie 1984, 80-81). 
 
The five interlocking conditions constitute a special institution known as “artworld”, and any 
object of art must present to this special institution. 
 
There are several objections against institutional conventionalism. First, the institutional 
context is not necessary for art creation, and it ignores the possibility of private arts and the 
initial arts. Consider those initial works of art, for example, the cave paintings in Cave of 
Altamira. It seems that there is no any artworld system, framework, or anything that 
constitutes an institution to confer the art status to those paintings, but those paintings are 
still works of art. Second, the operation of the conferring of art status seems to be vague and 
arbitrary, and the question of who is considered to be an artist and how to be an artist in the 
artworld remains to be answered. It seems that not everyone can be an artist in the artworld, 
as exemplified by Sclafani: A urinal presented to the artworld by a salesman as a radical 
revolutionary art would not have been conferred a work of art status, and therefore would not 
have enjoyed success as Duchamp had (Sclafani 1973). Third, the definition is useless in 
distinguishing art institution from other social institution, such as legal system, and is 
                                               
4 According to Adajian, Danto’s meaning of “atmosphere of theories” has been glossed by 
Danto and Carroll as follows: “something is a work of art if and only if (i) it has a subject (ii) 
about which it projects some attitude or point of view (has a style) (iii) by means of 
rhetorical ellipsis (usually metaphorical) which ellipsis engages audience participation in 
filling in what is missing, and (iv) where the work in question and the interpretations thereof 




seemingly circular. In other words, those five conditions are defined based on each other, 
and as such, provide no information for the clarification.5  
 
The first objection causes the biggest problem to the definition. It shows that the institutional 
approach cannot properly account for certain objects that are considered to be works of art, 
such as private art and initial art, and it violates our intuition that the creation of art can be 
separated from a social context. This leads to the formation of the historical approach.  
 
2.1.2. Historical Conventionalism 
Historicists deny that work of art is essentially a social or institutional concept. Rather, they 
define an object as a work of art by certain connection between the current object and 
previous art objects, which can vary according to different versions of historical definitions. 
All historical definitions are based on a recursive structure, which include an initial step and 
a recursive step. The initial step assumes the existence of certain works of art known as Ur-
arts, and later objects obtain the art status through its relation with the Ur-art in the recursive 
step. 
 
There are different forms of historical definition, such as that by Carroll and Stecker (Carroll 
1988, Stecker 2001). The most famous version of historical definition is Levinson’s 
intentional historical definition (Levinson 1979, 1989, 1993), in which he defined a work of 
art by the intentional relation between a new work of art and previous works of art. 
According to this definition, an object is a work of art if and only if a person with an 
appropriate proprietary right over the object, non-passingly intends it to be regarded as some 
previous works of art has been correctly regarded. For instance, if a work of art is to be 
correctly regarded as [A,B,C] at t1, then an object is a work of art at t2 if and only if the 
maker of the object intends it to be regarded minimally as [A,B,C]. The maker may intend it 
to be regarded as something other than [A,B,C]. For example, he can intend it to be regarded 
as [A,B,C,D,E,F], but [A,B,C] must be included in order for the work to obtain art status. 
Under this definition, the concept of art is continuously expanding through time.  
 
Levinson further categorized this relation into transparent and opaque. A relation is 
transparent when the maker possesses an art-conscious intention. For instance, the maker is 
                                               
5 Dickie actually admitted that his definition is circular. However, he claimed that his 
definition is not a vicious cycle, since he at least provided some information about the 
artworld (Dickie 1987). And he actually flaunted the circularity of his definition by saying 
that “if art is the sort of thing I think it is, the only correct account of it would be a circular 
account” (Dickie 1984, 78). 
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aware of the history of art and intends his creation to be regarded as similar to certain 
previous works of art. On the other hand, a relation is opaque when the maker’s intention is 
art-unconscious, that is, the maker is ignorant of the history of art development. The isolated 
maker is an example of such. Levinson claimed that, in the latter case, the maker must have 
in mind a clear and descriptive list of how he intends his work to be regarded in order to 
generate the relation. 
 
There are several objections against the historical approach. First, both Gregory Currie 
(Currie 1993) and Davies (Davies 2000) commented that, in all forms of historical 
definition, only the concept of art in western tradition have been considered, while non-
Western art traditions, for instance, those in China, Japan, and India, are ignored. Currie 
criticized historicists for only tracing through western art history in the recursive steps and 
Ur-arts that are central to western art tradition. As a result, the appearance of non-Western 
art traditions is ruled out, because non-Western art traditions can never be traced back to 
Western Ur-arts. Second, Levinson’s historical definition is incomplete in that he defined 
works of art through the recursive structure based on the initial step of Ur-arts, but what 
made Ur-arts works of art in the initial step? The question is that Ur-arts were unable to 
obtain their status of art through relation to any previous art, because, by this definition, 
there is no art prior to the Ur-arts. This problem can be solved by Stecker’s historical 
functional approach, in which Ur-arts can be considered to be distinct from other non-art 
object through certain function. However, this implies that Stecker’s definition is a 
disjunctive one, since something can be a work of art either by satisfying the primary 
function mentioned in the first clause or by belonging to an established art form. A possible 
problem is that some philosophers do not consider a disjunctive definition an essential 
definition. 
 
2.1.3. Problem with Conventionalism 
The biggest problem with the conventionalism approach in defining art is the emptiness of 
the account. Conventionalism relies on our acquired background knowledge of art 
development to define and distinguish art objects from non-art objects. However, 
conventionalists provide only few details about the distinctive properties of art that could 
help distinguish art from non-art. Such little information on the nature of art is far from 
enough to satisfy the need for a definition account. 
Consider Dickie’s definition as an example. He did not provide any detail about the function 
that distinguishes art from non-art. If we tell a foreigner who is unfamiliar with our culture 
about Dickie’s definition and then ask the foreigner to distinguish art from non-art, the 
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foreigner may be confused, because he neither has idea on our concept of art, nor idea on the 
functions of our art.  
 
2.2. Functionalism (Aestheticism) 
Instead of seeking a definition that can account for all alleged works of art, Beardsley 
suggested that philosophers should look for a definition that provides philosophical interests, 
and care about objects that afford aesthetic interest or experience (Beardsley 1982). In 
Beardsley’s view, works of art are 1) arrangements of conditions which are intended by its 
creator to afford an experience with marked aesthetic character (hereafter referred to as 
“aesthetic experience”) and 2) arrangements that belong to a class or type of arrangements 
that is typically intended to have this capacity. Beardsley used the notion “arrangements”, 
because he believed that many objects are created with more than one intention (that why the 
term is in plural), but the crucial point in Beardsley’s definition is the aesthetic intention. 
Beardsley’s definition involves two disjunctive clauses, but that does not make it a 
disjunctive definition. The term “capacity” refers to the capacity to “afford an experience 
with marked aesthetic character” as mentioned in the condition 1). Thus the concept of art is 
connected with the concept of aesthetic. Beardsley put aside the intention consideration in 
the second clause, because he believed that certain forms of art (for example, form of fine 
art: painting, sculpture, architecture, music and poetry) are primarily or typical aimed at or 
designed for affording an aesthetic experience. It is not necessary to consider the author’s 
intention when viewing work that is produced in those art forms, because the fact that the 
author fashions the work already implies the author’s aesthetic intention.  
It is also noteworthy that Beardsley’s definition is based on two meta-aesthetic 
considerations. The first consideration is that a definition of art should account for the role 
that is theoretically significant in an aesthetic theory and help to clarify the most important 
feature or the central concern that distinguishes aesthetic theory from other theories. The 
second consideration is that a definition of work of art should stay as close as it can to 
ordinary use. Beardsley claimed that his definition captures the prominent usage of the term 
in everyday life, except for the usage of avant-garde art, which Beardsley considered a form 
of art that does not involve aesthetics interest.  
 
There are several objections against Beardsley’s definition. First, the intention of providing 
aesthetic experience is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for defining art. His 
definition is not sufficient because it is unable to distinguish works of art from crafts. It is 
not necessary because the avant-garde art, which is ordinarily considered a class of art, is 
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usually not intended to provide aesthetic experience to audience.
6
 Some crafts are intended 
to afford aesthetic experience, but are not considered works of art. Second, some 
philosophers, such as Davies (Davies 1991), argued that aesthetic experience is not a proper 
way to define art, because one cannot distinguish aesthetic experience from other sorts of 
experience, and the features of aesthetic experience that Beardsley claimed to have are 
highly similar to religious experience.  
 
2.3. Robert Stecker’s View on Defining Art 
The previous sections show that neither conventionalism nor functionalism is able to 
construct a satisfactory definition of art. Conventionalism is better in accounting for 
contemporary art development, but it faces serious challenges in explaining the status of art 
of Ur-arts. On the contrary, functionalism performs well in explaining the status of art of Ur-
arts, but it is difficult to account for contemporary arts. However, Stecker noticed that there 
are three convergences from all unsuccessful attempts (Stecker 2000), which he considered 
proof that a successful definition could be developed. 
 
First, Stecker noted that all contemporary definitions of art are actually disjunctive in 
structure. The disjunctive structure is either explicit or non-explicit. He explained his point 
by examining some primary definitions of art. Historical functionalism, which is composed 
of two clauses, is explicitly disjunctive. The first clause is the functional clause that is used 
to classify Ur-art. The second clause is the historical functional clause that is used to connect 
latter art to the first art. Historical intentionalism is non-explicit but essentially disjunctive, 
and artworks can be regarded as either intrinsic or relational. There are alternative sufficient 
conditions for being art, one sets out in terms of creative processes in the mind of the artist, 
another sets out in terms of appropriation and projection by artworld communities. 
Moreover, an initial condition for defining Ur-art is required. Otherwise, the account is 
incomplete. Thus, at least one more clause should be added into the historical intentionalism 
account. The added clause must be a disjunctive clause, since the first art is turned into art by 
                                               
6
 Beardsley replied to some of those objections. He believed that non-aesthetic art, for 
instance avant-garde art, is not art at all. Therefore, those objects are not counterexamples of 
his aesthetic definition. He argued that accepting those allegedly non-aesthetic works of art 
as works of art would mean abandoning “common sense… along with philosophical 
acumen”. “The fuss that has been made about Duchamp’s Fountain has long amazed me. It 
does not seem that in submitting that object to the art show and getting it more or less hidden 
from view, Duchamp or anyone else thought of it either as art or as having an aesthetic 
capacity. He did not establish a new meaning of ‘artwork,’ nor did he really inaugurate a 
tradition that led to the acceptance of plumbing figures (or other ‘readymades’) as artworks 
today” (Beardsley 1983, 25). 
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a reason that is different from all later arts. Even Gaut’s cluster conception of art is 
disjunctive. Gaut claimed that a cluster concept is a concept that has no single sufficient and 
necessary condition but several different sufficient conditions (Gaut 2000). None of those 
conditions are individually necessary, but they are disjunctively forming a necessary 
condition. In other words, for certain object O to be classified as a cluster concept C, O must 
satisfy at least one sufficient condition in the disjunctive clause of C. Finally, Dickie’s 
account of institutional definition is not adequate, unless a disjunctive clause for defining Ur-
art is added, since no artworld existed before Ur-arts, and the Ur-arts should be turned into 
art by a reason that is different from all the latter arts. Thus, Dickie’s account must be 
disjunctive. 
  
Second, Stecker concluded that all contemporary definitions tend to refer to the function and 
history of art. He believed that the failure of Dickie’s and Levinson’s definition shows the 
necessity of including a functional component in a definition. However, the function of art is 
changeable, as once “the art traditions and institutions are established, the functions of art 
and the intentions with which it is made can diverge in unforeseeable ways” (Stecker 2000, 
51). That is why it is necessary to refer to the historical development of art when identifying 
works of art. Stecker believed that all contemporary definitions make such a reference.  
Third, Stecker discovered that all contemporary definitions include both intentional and 
institutional considerations. For example, Dickie defined works of art as artifacts that are 
intended to be presented to artworld audience. This definition contains both intentional and 
institutional components. Specifically, the term “intended to be” refers to the creator’s 
intention during the creation process, and the term “artworld audience” refers to a special 
social institution, namely, the artworld. These two components are also found in historical 
functionalism. Stecker defined art as object that intends to fulfill special functions of certain 
art forms. Moreover, there are certain central art forms in different periods of time. The 
notion of “central art form” implies the institutional consideration, because the distinction 
between central and other remote art forms is made by artworld audience in a specific period 
of time. The intentional component is obvious in this account. The term “intend to fulfill’ 
refers to the author’s intentional content during the creation process. Stecker claimed that the 
institutional consideration also appears in Levinson’s definition, in which the status of art of 
certain works, for example, Ur-arts, is attained some time after the creation of those works. 
In others words, certain works were not art at the time they were created, but are turned into 
works of art after a period of time. Specifically, a work may be intended by its author to be 
regarded as a certain way R, while R is not a way of regarding art at that time. Thus, the 
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work was not a work of art at the time it was created.
7
 But later on, the public considers R as 
a proper way of regarding art, thus the work acquires its status of art at that time, which is 
some time after it has been created. For this kind of works, they acquire their status of art in 
virtue of being appropriated by the audience. Thus, Levinson has actually employed the 
notion of institution in his account.  
 
2.4. Stephen Davies’ Disjunctive Definition of Art 
Based on Stecker’s view on defining art, Davies constructed a disjunctive definition with all 
those convergence properties included by combining the claims of both conventionalism and 
functionalism in a disjunctive structure. Under this definition, an object is a work of art if 
and only if: 
 
“1) it shows excellence of skill and achievement in realizing significant aesthetic goals, and 
doing so is its primary, identifying function or doing so makes a vital contribution to the 
realization of its primary, identifying function, 2) it falls under an art genre or art form 
established and publicly recognized within the art tradition, and 3) it is intended by its 
maker/presenter to be art and its maker/presenter does what is necessary and appropriate to 
realizing that intention” (Davies 2015, 377-378).  
 
Clause 1) is generated from the claim of functionalists, who associate concept of art with 
functional properties, Clause 2) is based on the claim of conventionalists, who associate 
concept of art with a special tradition and a publicly recognized institution, and Clause 3) is 
the claim of intentionists, who associate concept of art with the author’s intentions. 
 
Davies insisted that all three clauses are necessary. Clause 1) avoids the circularity of the 
definition. Since Clause 2) and Clause 3) both make reference to “art genre”, “art form”, “art 
tradition”, and art-conscious intention, a clause that clarifies the concept of art is needed, 
otherwise the definition explains nothing. The latter part of Clause 1) implies that works of 
art can be decided to be multifunctional, as Davies believed that it is common for art to serve 
or enhance functions other than that the aesthetic one (Davies 2006). For instance, art is 
often used as a mean to illustrate creation myths or religious stories, or to add power to 
ritual. Clause 2) shows the directionality of art’s history, and accounts for works of art that 
are created in stages other than the initial one. This is based on Davies’ view that art creation 
                                               
7
 Levinson’s idea was criticized for failing to properly account for the status of first art, since 
no work is available to set the recursive ball rolling. Davies outlined this difficulty in his 
paper: “First art must be art already at the time second wave pieces become art, otherwise, 
second wave pieces could not be art as a result of standing to first art in the art-defining 
relation” (Davies 1997, 21), and Levinson admitted that he did not have a proper solution to 
this difficulty (Levinson 2002). 
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can transcend its origins once a tradition of art making is established (Davies 2015). Clause 
3) leaves room for the contemporary development of art. Davies commented that unaesthetic 
objects must be created at a time that artworld public is ready to accept them. For example, 
Fountain does not fall under any art genre, art form, or publicly recognized art tradition, but 
the art-conscious intention and the appropriate time of creation turned that unaesthetic object 
into contemporary art. 
  
Davies’ paper is inspiring, but I consider his disjunctive proposal inadequate. A problem is 
that his definition fails to illuminate the point of art - the very reason that makes people 
continuously treasure art. Davies might probably reply that his definition is merely to 
correctly account for most, if not all, instance of works of art. His intention was to construct 
a descriptive, instead of a normative, definition that would supposedly tell what is actually 
counted as works of art, instead of telling what kind of things should be counted as works of 
art. Thus, his definition needs not illuminate the point of art. However, I think that it is 
inappropriate to draw the descriptive and normative distinction, and I believe that it is 
possible to combine those two considerations to develop a satisfactory definition that is able 
to account for most instances of works of art and also to illuminate the point of art. 
Moreover, while I agree with Stecker that a satisfactory definition of art needs to be 
disjunctive to certain degree, it does not imply that the definition needs to be a disjunctive 
definition. A satisfactory definition also needs to make reference to different structures, says 
functional, institution, intentional, and historical, aspects of art, but this does not mean that 
the definitional clause needs to be disjunctive in structure. It is possible to unify all those 
different aspects with a non-disjunctive definitional clause. To this end, I believe that Gary 
Iseminger’s new aestheticism is able to combine the descriptive and normative 
considerations while being disjunctive to a certain degree, which conforms to the 
convergences mentioned by Stecker. In the next chapter, I will summarize Iseminger’s 








Chapter 2 - Introduction  
In this chapter, I will argue for the aesthetic approach to defining art. I will attempt to defend 
new aestheticism, which is proposed by Gary Iseminger in his book The Aesthetic Function 
of Art (Iseminger 2004). Iseminger’s new aestheticism is constructed on top of his notion of 
appreciation, which he considered to be an aesthetic state of mind that is useful for 
explaining the notion of aesthetic experience, which in turn helps define the concept of art.8 
However, Iseminger’s notion of appreciation seemingly is unable to account for all 
experiences that we consider to be aesthetic.9 Therefore, I will replace Iseminger’s notion of 
appreciation with the neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension and argue that the latter is 
able to account for examples that are ignored in the former. The chapter will end with a 
discussion of the advantages of the replacement and objections to my argument. 
 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 4 is a summary of Iseminger’s new 
aestheticsim, which will cover his two main theses, the valuational thesis and the function 
thesis, and other supplementary claims. I will also discuss Iseminger’s notion of appreciation 
and related problems. Section 5 is a summary of Livingston’s neo-Lewisian notion of value-
apprehension, which is mainly based on C. I. Lewis’ book An Analysis of Knowledge and 
Valuation (Lewis 1946) and Paisley Livingston’s papers on it (Livingston 2004). Finally, in 
Section 6, I will discuss the differences between Iseminger’s notion of appreciation and the 
neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension, show how the neo-Lewisian notion of value-
apprehension may help to solve the problems found in Iseminger’s notion of appreciation, 
and explain the advantages of replacing the notion of appreciation with the notion of value-
apprehension.  
 
1. Iseminger’s New Aestheticism 
                                               
8 Although I used the term “define” here, the term does not imply that Iseminger attempted 
to provide an essentialist account of art. In fact, Iseminger mentioned explicitly that he has 
no intention to claim that the concept of art is essentially connected with the concept of 
aesthetic (Iseminger 2004). 
9 One may notice that Iseminger actually pointed out that there is not a distinctive sort of 
experiences called aesthetic experience. There is only a distinctive aesthetic state of mind, 
that is, the state of appreciation (Iseminger 2005). Although I disagree with Iseminger on this 
point, as I believe that there is a distinction between aesthetic experience and non-aesthetic 
experience, I would not claim that “Iseminger’s notion of aesthetic experience is inadequate 
because his account is unable to state the objective distinction between aesthetic experiences 
and other sorts of experiences”. Rather, I intend to show that Iseminger’s notion of aesthetic 
experience is unable to account for some actual examples that are considered to be instances 
of aesthetic experience.  
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This section is a summary of Iseminger’s new aestheticism, which he proposed in his book 
The Aesthetic Function of Art. Unlike traditional aestheticism, Iseminger’s proposal attempts 
to define institutions of art (the artworld and practices of art) rather than works of art. 
Moreover, he did not view the aesthetic function of institutions of art as essential, but only as 
a historical fact (Iseminger 2004). While it is counter-factually possible that the function of 
institutions of art is not to promote aesthetic communication, institutions of art, in reality, are 
in fact functioning to promote aesthetic communication. However, this does not mean that 
works of art are undefinable. It only means that works of art are institutional entities, and the 
common property of works of art is the institutional property. Generally speaking, 
Iseminger’s proposal can be divided into two parts: i) the functional part, and ii) the 
institutional part. The functional part clarifies the function of target institution - institutions 
of art. Iseminger claimed that the function of institutions of art is to promote aesthetic 
communication. Thus, Iseminger’s proposal is an aesthetic one. The institutional part 
clarifies the common nature of works of art. Iseminger viewed works of art as institutional 
entities. Therefore, Iseminger’s proposal is an institutional one. It is clear that parts i) and ii) 
refer to different subjects. Part i) refers to institutions of art, while part ii) refers to works of 
art. Moreover, Iseminger’s proposal implies that the concept of institution of art is 
functional, while the concept of work of art is procedural.  
 
1.1. The Functional Thesis  
Same as traditional aestheticism, new aestheticism holds a functional thesis. However, the 
subject of the two theses is different. The traditional functional thesis states that: (F) 
“Something is a work of art if and only if its function is to afford aesthetic experience” 
(Iseminger 2004, 8). In contrast, the functional thesis of new aestheticism states that: (F’) 
“The function of the artworld and practice of art is to promote aesthetic communication” 
(Iseminger 2004, 23). The subject of (F’) has shifted from work of art to the artworld and 
practice of art. Nevertheless, “thesis (F’) still asserts a strong claim between art and the 
aesthetic” (Iseminger 2004, 120). Thus, it still meets our aesthetic institution that art and 
aesthetic are importantly linked with each other.  
 
Iseminger claimed that (F’) keeps his new aestheticism away from the anti-essentialist 
objection and the anti-functionalist objection. The anti-essentialist objection was proposed 
by Weitz, who claimed that the concept of art is expansive and open. Thus, it is impossible 
to define the concept of art (Weitz 1956). Weitz’s idea is based on Wittgensteinian 
reflections that many concepts do not have essential condition, and instances of those 
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concepts can only be told by “looking and seeing”. Weitz argued that we would not be able 
to find any essential condition if we “look and see” all works of art.  
 
At the same time, Iseminger believed that (F’) is free from the anti-essentialist objection 
because of two reasons. First, Iseminger did not intend to make any essentialist claim with 
(F’), as he did not consider the concept of work of art or the concept of institution of art to be 
essentially connected with the concept of aesthetic. Iseminger merely claimed that the 
concept of institution of art is connected with the concept of aesthetic, since the function of 
institution of art (artworlds and practices of art) is to promote aesthetic communication 
historically. Moreover, a strong majority of artworks have an aesthetic function, even if 
some artworks are anti-aesthetic.10 Second, the subject of (F’) is not works of art, but 
institutions of art. Thus, (F’) is free from the anti-essentialist objection since the objection is 
designed to argue against any attempt on defining work of arts, but not institutions of art. 
Specifically, in employing the method of “look and see”, Weitz only referred to works of art, 
but not institutions of art.  
 
Iseminger also proposed that (F’) is able to meet that the institutionalist or anti-functionalist 
objection. Institutionalists or antifunctionalists claim that the concept of art is a procedural 
concept, but not a functional concept. Therefore, philosophers, such as Davies and Dickie, 
reject (F), since not all artworks have or intend to have an aesthetic function, and this cannot 
be a defining property for works of art.11 They notice the fact that some members occupy 
various roles in different institutions of work, and they have the power to confer status. For 
instance, there are formal institutions like art schools, “whose officers have power to confer 
the B.F.A. degree on their graduates” (Iseminger 2004, 15). Also, an influential critic may 
informally confer on a work of art such status as “the most influential contemporary work”. 
Therefore, institutionalists think that “to be a work of art is to enjoy a status that is dependent 
on a social institution that empowers people to confer that status” (Iseminger 2004, 15), and 
traditional aestheticism is wrong since it holds that works of art can be defined solely by its 
function. Iseminger’s proposal does not face institutionalist or antifunctionalist objection, 
because new aestheticism takes into account the institutional clause when defining works of 
art: “A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public for 
                                               
10 Thanks to Stephen Davies for providing this point in his comments after my thesis 
examination. 




appreciation” (Iseminger 2015, 388). Moreover, (F’) is a claim on the actual function of 
institutions of art, and it can only be objected by actual counter-example. 
 
1.1.1. The Notion of Aesthetic Communication  
In order to further clarify (F’), it is important to explain the notion of aesthetic 
communication. According to Iseminger, a paradigm of aesthetic communication involves 
three elements: 1) a creator, 2) an artifact, and 3) an appreciator. Iseminger made reference 
to Leo Tolstoy’s idea of art, which views art as a human activity that consists of transaction. 
This transaction involves “two people and something ‘external’ that one produces for the 
other” (Iseminger 2004, 32). The notion of aesthetic communication is defined as follows: 
“Aesthetic communication is someone making an artifact with the aim and effect that 
someone else appreciates it” (Iseminger 2015, 388). Aesthetic communication exists prior to 
the appearance of any artistic communication or institution of art. It is independent from the 
concept of art and serves as the foundation for the concept of art. Iseminger believed that this 
notion helps to account for the absent artist objection, which claims that the traditional 
aestheticism is “inherently biased toward the spectator or audience” (Iseminger 2004, 21), 
since it underlines the concept of aesthetic experience, which refers to experiences of the 
spectator or audience. However, one may think that the role of artist also needs to be 
considered seriously, because works of art are not merely beautiful objects. They are 
designed by someone. In this sense, (F) seems to have disregarded the important role of 
artist, potentially leading to a confusion between the concept of art and the concept of natural 
beauty. Iseminger’s new aestheticism is free from this objection, because artist (creator) is 
one of the three elements in a paradigm of aesthetic communication, having the same 
importance as work of art and appreciator.  
 
1.1.2. The Notion of Appreciation 
The notion of aesthetic communication relies on a more fundamental notion, namely, the 
notion of appreciation. Iseminger described appreciation as “finding the experiencing of a 
state of affairs to be valuable in itself” (Iseminger 2004, 36)12, and “experiencing a state of 
affairs is a matter of having direct (non-inferential but not necessarily infallible) knowledge 
that the state of obtains” (Iseminger 2004, 36). The most fundamental notion in Iseminger’s 
                                               
12 Iseminger did not use the term “intrinsically valuable”, since he thought that the term is 
not identical with the term “value” for its own sake (Iseminger 2005). The term “intrinsically 
valuable” is a technical term that is conceptually complicated and may not be accessible to 
ordinary people. Including in the term “intrinsically valuable” may result in excluding the 




new aestheticism, the notion of appreciation is helpful for distinguishing aesthetic state of 
mind from non-aesthetic state of mind. In Iseminger’s words, it is a mean of “breaking into 
aesthetic space” to avoid the problem of circular reference.  
 
There are two points worthy of mentioning in Iseminger’s claims. First, his notion of 
appreciation is a subjective one. Iseminger explained his notion of appreciation in terms of 
“aesthetic state of mind”, with the term aesthetic referring merely to a distinctive state of 
mind of appreciator rather than a distinctive sort of experiences: “the aesthetic state of mind 
- appreciation - is to be identified as essentially valuing an experience for its own sake” 
(Iseminger 2005, 103). Moreover, Iseminger pointed out that having the “aesthetic state of 
mind” in experiencing a state of affairs does not turn the experience into an aesthetic one, 
and “there is no such thing as a distinctively aesthetic experience” (Iseminger 2005, 103). A 
person who values an experience for its own sake does not turn the experience into aesthetic 
one in the objective sense. In other words, aesthetic experiences are objectively the same as 
other sorts of experiences. Therefore, Iseminger considered it misleading to say that “the 
aesthetic experience is to be identified as ‘an experience essentially valued for its own sake’” 
(Iseminger 2005, 103). Even when an experience is being valued for its own sake, the 
experience is not an aesthetic one. Rather, having the mental state of “valuing an experience 
for its own sake” is essential in having an aesthetic state of mind. In Iseminger’s point of 
view, it is misleading to attribute the term aesthetic to any sort of experience. Rather, the 
term aesthetic should be attributed to a distinctive state of mind. Thus, saying that an 
experience is aesthetic is misleading. Instead, one should say that someone experiences a 
state of affairs aesthetically, or someone has an aesthetic state of mind when experiencing a 
state of affairs. Iseminger further clarified valuing as having a certain belief.13 Having the 
mental state “valuing an experience for its own sake” is to believe “not merely for reasons 
that describe something as a means to other ends that it is good” (Iseminger 2005, 105). For 
instance, one may believe “something like a human life is better all else being equal just for 
having included this experience” (Iseminger 2005, 106).  
 
In summary, Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is composed of two conceptually distinctive 
parts: i) an experiential component, which is having direct and non-inferential knowledge, 
and ii) a mental state of valuing an experience component for its own sake, which is holding 
a belief that having this experience will make human life better. Although i) and ii) are both 
essential for an appreciation, only ii) is essentially aesthetic. Therefore, Iseminger’s notion 
                                               
13 This is to say that the property “be aesthetic” should be attributed to a person’s state of 
mind instead of an experience. 
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of aesthetic appreciation is subjective “in that it is in the form of some person’s subjectively 
valuing or finding value in an experience rather than the experience’s objectively having 
value or being valuable that that concept figures in the account” (Iseminger 2005, 101-102). 
At the same time, Iseminger notion of appreciation is an epistemic one. It considers 
appreciation as involving a specific mode of knowledge, namely, “direct or non-inferential 
knowledge” (Iseminger 2009). For instance, we would say that listening, rather than 
watching, is the primary mode of experiencing the qualities of Mozart’s Symphony No. 41.14 
Thus, appreciation is a special mode of having knowledge. Iseminger insisted that directly 
experiencing a state of affairs is necessary in order to appreciate it, and is in accordance with 
our aesthetic institution that “the only way truly to grasp a work of art is by experiencing it” 
(Iseminger 2004, 10). This also helps to “support[s] a distinction between what is relevant 
and what is irrelevant for the appreciation of works of art in term of which of their properties 
are experienceable and which are not” (Iseminger 2004, 120), which meets our aesthetic 
institution that “there are some ways of regarding art that involve not truly treating it as art” 
(Iseminger 2004, 10). Moreover, the knowledge must be true in order for one to appreciate 
something.  
 
The notion of appreciation is also able withstand the anti-psychological objection and the 
anti-formalist objection. The anti-psychological objection claims that “there is no such state 
of mind - no ‘aesthetic emotion’, ‘aesthetic experience’… that is at once 
phenomenologically distinctive, introspectively discernible, and capable of plausibly doing 
duty as the fundamental notion in as account of realm of the aesthetic and thereby in a 
definition of art” (Iseminger 2004, 16). Some philosophers, such as Dickie, hold that 
aesthetic experience is not phenomenologically distinctive from other sorts of experiences, 
and transitional aestheticism “appeals to bogus acts or states of mind” (Iseminger 2004, 42). 
Iseminger claimed that his notion of appreciation can withstand the anti-psychological 
                                               
14 As Stephen Davies mentioned in my thesis examination, the distinction here is the 
knowledge gained directly through perceptual experience and the knowledge gained through 
conscious reasoning, but not the sense modalities. However, the example is still explanatory, 
because the appropriate sense modalities can help to explain the distinction between the 
inferential knowledge and the non-inferential knowledge. For example, a person, A, watches 
(without listen) a pianist performing Rimsky-Korsakov’s Flight of the Bumblebee and says 
that the pace of this song is fast (because he sees the fingers of the pianist moving fast). 
Another person, B, listens the same pianist performing Flight of the Bumblebee and says that 
the pace of this song is fast. We then conclude that person A’s knowledge is inferential, 
while person B’s knowledge is a non-inferential. And one possible explanation of the above 
conclusion is that listening, rather than watching, is the primary (and appropriate) mode of 
experiencing qualities of a musical work. Therefore, the distinction between sense modalities 
may help to explain the distinction between inferential and non-inferential knowledge. 
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objection, since it is borrowed from “the philosopher who has most prominently advanced 
that objection, George Dickie” (Iseminger 2004, 42). Dickie commented that “all this is 
meant by ‘appreciation’ in the definition is something like ‘in experiencing the qualities of a 
thing one finds them worthy or valuable’” (Dickie 1974, 40-41). Iseminger regarded the 
phrase “experiencing the qualities of a thing” as “emphasiz[ing] both the structure of the 
object of experience as a state of affairs and the cognitive nature of experience” (Iseminger 
2004, 43), making it similar to his notion of experiencing. Moreover, the phrase “finds them 
worthy or valuable” distinguishes valuings from pleasures or enjoyments, which is also 
similar to Iseminger notion of valuable in itself. Therefore, Iseminger concluded that 
“Dickie’s account of appreciation can be turned into something tantamount to my account 
simply by replacing ‘them’ by ‘it’, and inserting ‘in itself’ at the end” (Iseminger 2004, 43).  
 
On the other hand, the anti-formalist objection claims that traditional aestheticism is too 
exclusive when considering which types of properties are artistically relevant. For instance, 
Bell held that only the “relations and combinations of lines and colors” are artistically 
relevant properties (Bell 1914, 62), and suggested that “to appreciate a work of art we need 
bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its 
emotion” (Bell 1914, 68). This kind of thoughts leads to the appearance of formalism, which 
seems to dismiss many types of properties that are artistically relevant in appreciation, such 
as semantic and expressive properties. However, Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is 
“sufficiently rich that… it comfortably encompasses semantic and expressive properties as 
well as strictly formal ones” (Iseminger 2004, 119). 
 
1.1.3. The Notion of Practice of Art 
In Iseminger’s view, “practices, at a minimum, are activities regularly engaged in by a 
significant number of people” (Iseminger 2004, 62). However, not all regular activities are 
practices, and the factor that distinguishes them is what John Searle called constitutive rule 
(Iseminger 2004). Constitutive rules “take the form ‘X counts as Y’ or ‘X counts as Y in 
context C’. The rules of chess, for instance, are constitutive “in the sense that playing chess 
is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules. If you don’t follow at least a large 
subset of the rules you are not playing chess”. “Thus such and such counts as a checkmate, 
such and such counts as a legal pawn move, and so on” (Searle 1995, 28).  
 
Institutional facts are facts that depend on the existence of constitutive rules. For instance, 
the fact that Donald John Trump is President of the United States is an institutional fact that 
only exists within human institutions. Iseminger further distinguished between primarily 
 
26 
institutional facts and derivatively institutional facts. The former are facts that “are 
institutional in the sense that their existence depends on there being in effect constitutive 
rules saying what counts as a fact of that kind” (Iseminger 2004, 65). In contrast, the latter 
are facts that “are institutional in the somewhat weaker sense that their existence depends on 
there being in effect some constitutive rule saying what counts as a fact of some kind” 
(Iseminger 2004, 65-66). For instance, the fact that Donald John Trump is President of the 
United States is a primarily institutional fact. The fact takes the form X1 (Donald John 
Trump) counts as Y1 (President of the United States) in C1 (being certified by the Electors 
and sworn in by the Chief Justice) (Iseminger 2004). If the constitutive rule C1 is absent, the 
fact cannot hold. In contrast, the fact that two specific pawns are now less than six inches is a 
derivatively institutional fact. The fact does not take the form “X counts as Y in context C” 
since “there plainly does not have to be any constitutive rule recognized by and in effect 
among chess players saying what counts as being less than six inches apart” (Iseminger 
2004, 65). The fact also cannot hold if the constitutive rules of chess are absent, since there 
would not be any pawn.  
 
Formal institutions need not be involved in a practice. However, there must at least “exist 
people who have a concept of that practice” (Iseminger 2004, 67). Closely connected but not 
identical with the notion of practice is the notion of world, with the former necessarily 
involved in the latter. A world is “a group of people, the members of the world, who 
recognize one another as engaged in a practice in various ways and to various degrees” 
(Iseminger 2004, 67), and is constructed by some practices. The notion of world also does 
not imply the notion of practice. For instance, we do not name any practice as world. Rather, 
we only call those practices that reach a certain size and are influential to their members a 
world. Worlds are consisted of institutions, which can either be formal or informal, and do 
not necessarily have “constitutions, formal requirements for membership, official 
publications, annual meetings, officers, and so on” (Iseminger 2004, 68). The fundamental 
factor that holds a world is “a web of mutual recognition among their members” (Iseminger 
2004, 68). In other words, members of a world need to have shared concepts of the world, 
and this web of mutual recognition “makes possible the existence of such primarily 
institutional facts as the fact that someone is (count as) a churchgoer, a football fan, a farmer, 
and so on” (Iseminger 2004, 68).  
 
1.1.4. The notion of the Artworld 
Iseminger mentioned that “art is a practice and those who participate in it are members of the 
informal institution of artworld” (Iseminger 2004, 68), and pointed out that “the very 
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existence of artists, works of art, artistic audiences, art critics, art dealers, art museums, art 
schools, and so on, is metaphysically dependent on people having concepts such as artist and 
work of art” (Iseminger 2004, 69). This clarification is useful for further distinguishing 
between aesthetic communication and artistic communication and understanding Iseminger’s 
claim that aesthetic communication is independent from and a prior to artistic 
communication.  
 
The concept of artistic communication comprises mostly of primarily institutional facts. For 
instance, the fact that Fountain is a work of art takes the form X2 (Fountain) counts as Y2 (a 
work of art) in C2 (in the artworld). In contrast, aesthetic communication “doesn’t comprise 
as many primarily institutional facts” (Iseminger 2004, 70). For instance, the fact that 
Fountain is an object of appreciation does not take the form “X counts as Y in context C”. 
The concept of appreciation can hold even if the artworld is absent. Iseminger claimed that 
“arguably none of the concepts required to explain what aesthetic communication is - human 
being, making, aiming, causing, appreciating (that is valuing experiencing) - is primarily 
institutional” (Iseminger 2004, 70). The notion of an artworld refers “to a set of people and 
institutions involved in different ways in the practice of art” (Iseminger 2004, 71-72), and “it 
is not necessarily limited to people and institutions of our time and culture” (Iseminger 2004, 
72). Iseminger’s notion of the artworld is a broadening of that of Dickie’s, as Iseminger 
believed that members of the artworld do not merely involve people “who sees himself as a 
member of the artworld” (Dickie 1974, 36). It also involves “anyone who is seen by other 
members of the artworld as a member of the artworld” (Iseminger 2004, 72). The artworld 
that Iseminger conceived is a Western institution, although he did not eliminate the 
possibility that there are other non-Western artworlds. It should also be noted that the 
artworld is not identical to the worlds of arts. The worlds of the arts form the artworld (for 
example, the worlds of photography and cinema video art partly construct the artworld), and 
the artworld refers to the totality of all worlds of arts in the Western culture.   
 
1.2. The Claim of Artifactual Function 
The previous sections explained the notions that are involved in Iseminger’s functional thesis 
(F’). The functional thesis (F’) relies on another sufficient-condition claim (AF), namely, “If 
something is good at doing something that it was designed and made to do, then doing that is 
its (artifactual) function” (Iseminger 2004, 28). Iseminger claimed that the concept of 
function that is employed in (F’) is an artifactual function, and (AF) is a claim on artifactual 
function, which considers the functions of artifacts. For instance, we may say that the 
function of a blade is to cut. In saying so, we actually explain the function of the blade “in 
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terms of the intentions and action of a conscious agent” (Iseminger 2004, 80) who designs 
the blade to make it good at cutting. Iseminger regarded “things designed and made in 
accordance with that design are paradigmatically artifacts” (Iseminger 2004, 80), and 
institutions of art are designed and made to promote aesthetic communication. Therefore, it 
is appropriate to refer to the concept of artifactual function when explaining the function of 
institutions of art. Moreover, it seems plausible to claim that “something is good at doing 
something (at least in part) because someone designed and constructed it to do just that” 
(Iseminger 2004, 80), since the creators’ intentional actions are usually responsible for the 
appearance of some properties of an artifact that they have created. Iseminger then claimed 
that institutions are artifact and (AF) can be applied to either formal or informal institutions. 
Iseminger held an “adverbial” theory of artifactuality, and proposed that “the basic notion is 
that of having propertied artifactually, not having the property being an artifact” (Iseminger 
1973, 8). In saying that an object is an artifact, we are actually saying that some state of 
affairs of the object exists artifactually15. Artifacts are “designed and made”, and need not be 
physical objects, events, or processes. For example, formal institutions, such as Minneapolis 
College of Art and Design, are artifacts since some state of affairs of Minneapolis College of 
Art and Design, such as its name, location, and programs that it offers, exist artifactually. At 
the same time, informal institutions, such as artworlds, are also artifacts. Although no one 
knows exactly who designed and made the Western artworld, Iseminger considered it to 
have “come into existence, presumably as a result of the intentional actions of people, as it 
certainly has to this day continued to exist, to be maintained, and to be modified as a result 
of the intentional actions of its members” (Iseminger 2004, 91). Specifically, Iseminger used 
two facts to argue that artworlds are artifacts. First, the artworld did not exist prior to the 
middle of the eighteenth century (Kristeller 1951), even though “some component worlds 
that are now part of the artworld - the world of poetry, say or the world of painting” 
(Iseminger 2004, 73) have already existed. Thus, it is arguable that the artworld is designed 
and made by human being and therefore comes into existence. Second, Isemeinger 
mentioned that there are modifiers and maintainers who keep the artworld in existence. In 
this sense, we can say that at least some state of affairs of the world appears artifactually, 
and the artworld has certain degree of artifactuality.  
 
1.2.1. The Application of Artifactual Functional Claim 
                                               
15 By saying that a state of affairs exists artifactually, I mean that ‘a person or group of 
persons has responsibility for a state of affairs to the extent that his or their actions or 




(FA) is merely a conditional claim, and Iseminger needed to show that the conditional clause 
is fulfilled in order to support (F’). For this, Iseminger argued that the artworld is i) designed 
and made to promote aesthetic communication, and ii) good at doing so. These two claims 
will be considered separately. In arguing i), Iseminger appealed to two different approaches. 
First, Iseminger considered the initial stage of the appearance of the Western artworld, 
especially the ideas of people who are highly relevant to, if not responsible for, the 
appearance of the artworld. He mentioned that “the relevant ‘atmosphere of theory’ stems 
from Charles Batteux’s Les Beaux-Arts réduits à un même principe, which provided the 
conceptual resources for people to enter into the web of mutual recognition that constitutes 
the artworld as we know it” (Iseminger 2004, 106). Later on, Denis Diderot, Jean d’ 
Alembert, and Charles Lousi Mantesquieu, in the Encyclopedia 1751-1757, “codif[ied] the 
system of the fines arts after and beyond Batteux and through its prestige and authority 
g[iving] it the widest possible currency all over Europe” (Kristeller 1998, 423). The first and 
most explicit principle that justifies the peculiarity of the concept of fine art is the “imitation 
of Beautiful Nature”. Iseminger proposed that the principle “invokes recognizable precursors 
of the elements of what I have described as aesthetic communication” (Iseminger 2004, 
108), which is that someone makes and designs something with the aim that someone else 
appreciate it. An imitation of nature is “typically something designed and made by someone” 
(Iseminger 2004, 108). Second, Iseminger considered the modification and decay of the 
artworld, which is useful since those modifications involve principles held by the modifiers 
and maintainers that are helpful in telling the intention of those modifiers and maintainer. 
Iseminger suggested Mara Miller’s encyclopedia article “Gardens as Art” (Miller 1998) as 
an example, in which Miller proposed that gardens should be considered as a form of art 
because they have beautiful qualities and produce aesthetic experience intentionally. This 
shows that fulfilling the aesthetic criteria is a crucial concern in deciding whether a new 
practice or a world should be included in the artworld.  
 
In discussing ii), Iseminger considered two concepts of value: a) value as a matter of degree, 
and b) value as comparative. The former concept concerns the question “how good an 
artifact is”, while the latter considers the question “good compared with what”. In answering 
the question “how good an artifact is”, we may say “pretty good”, “barely acceptable”, 
“excellent”. In answering the question “good compared with what”, we may consider the 
values of two competitive candidates and our answer take the form “A is better than B in 
doing C” or “A is better in doing C than in doing D”. Iseminger argued that 1) the artworld is 
good enough at promoting the aesthetic, 2) the artworld is better than other institutions and 
practices in the modern Western world at promoting aesthetic, and 3) the artworld is better at 
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promoting aesthetic than doing other things, and that it is important to establish 1) before 
considering 2) and 3), because an artifact may be comparatively better than other candidates 
at doing something but still not very good at doing it. Even though it is not the case that 
works of art are conceptually necessary or contingently always intended by artists to afford 
appreciation, “it is safe to say that this is frequently the way artists proceed” (Iseminger 
2004, 97). Iseminger claimed that “frequently they [artists] fulfill their role in the artworld 
by making something intending that it shall afford appreciation and then making it available 
to others in a way and in such circumstance as to invite them to appreciate it” (Iseminger 
2004, 97). Thus, Iseminger believed that artworld is good enough at promoting the aesthetic 
under the concept a).  
 
1.2.2. Two Concepts of Good 
After establishing 1), Iseminger moved on to establishing 2). To do so, he compared the 
artworld with other potential candidates, namely, government and business, religion, politics, 
and advertising, industrial design, cooking, and gardening, and nature. Institutions of 
government and business promote the aesthetic by giving subsidies to artists or art schools, 
but this does not suggest that they are superior in promoting the aesthetic than the artworld. 
Rather, they subsidize individuals and institutions that are members of the artworld as a 
mean to promote the aesthetic. This is “very good evidence that the artworld is the primary 
promoter of the aesthetic and that business and government best serve whatever role they do 
in promoting the aesthetic by supporting the artworld, not by competing with it” (Iseminger 
2004, 98).  
 
Institutions of religion, politics, and advertising sometimes use aesthetic as means for their 
own purposes. Iseminger noticed that “at least sometime things that made in the service of 
religious, politics, or commerce are designed to afford and do afford appreciation - the 
‘Credo’ of Bach’s Mass in B Minor, the fourth movement of Shostakovich’s Symphony no. 
5, the advertisements from British television that are collected and shown annually at the 
Walker Art Center in Minneapolis” (Iseminger 2004, 99). Still, this does not imply that 
institutions of religion, politics, and advertising are better at promoting the aesthetic than the 
artworld, for the following three reasons. First, “the practices of religion, politics, and 
advertising promote the aesthetic only conditionally on its serving other purpose” (Iseminger 
2004, 100). In contrast, the artworld promotes the aesthetic unconditionally. The promotion 
of the aesthetic is the goal, and there is no further purpose. Second, and more importantly, 
“commissioning artifacts that afford appreciation is just one way among others that may be 
effective at persuading some of the people some of the time” (Iseminger 2004, 100). One 
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may persuade a person by giving reasons or good arguments, and those ways can also be 
used in institutions of religion, politics, and advertising. Thus, promotion of the aesthetic 
does not necessarily need to involve institutions of religion, politics, and advertising. Third, 
the instances of aesthetic communication in institutions of religion, politics, and advertising 
are not as abundant as those in the artworld. This is because “the instance of aesthetic 
communication these practices do support are determined by what they suppose will serve 
those further purposes and are thus likely to be of special kinds” (Iseminger 2004, 100).  
It is clear that institutions of industrial design, cooking, and gardening involve aesthetic 
communication, as “people design and make chairs, dinners, and gardens with the aim and 
effect (among others things) that people appreciate them, where this may include not only 
finding looking at them valuable in itself, but also sitting in them, eating them, or waling in 
them, as may be appropriate” (Iseminger 2004, 100). Ismeinger did not view institutions of 
industrial design, cooking, and gardening as competitors of the artworld. Instead, some of 
them are part of the artworld. For instance, Eames, a furniture designer, is recognized as 
artist. Landscape gardening was considered to be a kind of fine arts during the eighteenth 
century, and the French Culture Ministry subsidizes talented young chefs, just as the 
National Endowment for the Arts subsidizes talented individual artists.  
 
Finally, the institutions of nature appreciation, as Allen Carlson argued (Carlson 2000), 
“involves cognitive elements in something like I [Iseminger] have insisted that appreciation 
in general does” (Iseminger 2004, 101). Thus, it is arguable that institutions of nature 
appreciation are also able to promote the aesthetic. However, Iseminger saw limitations in 
such institutions promoting the aesthetic, because some “kinds of expressive qualities, which 
associates with the ‘artistic acts’ of a designer and maker - qualities such as wit, boldness, 
imaginativeness, and elegance” (Iseminger 2004, 102), are missing in appreciation of nature, 
since objects in nature have no designer and maker. Thus, “a range of qualities that may 
afford appreciation in artifact” (Iseminger 2004, 102) is missing in appreciation of natural 
objects. In contrast, these qualities are present in appreciation of artifacts. Therefore, 
Iseminger concluded that “the practice of nature appreciation is less efficacious than the 
practice of art at promoting the aesthetic” (Iseminger 2004, 102).  
 
In summary, Iseminger proposed that all competitive institutions belong to one of the 
following four kinds: “(i) an institution that promotes the aesthetic by promoting art, (ii) an 
institution that promotes the aesthetic by using it in pursuit of other more fundamental aims 
that it has, (iii) an institution that in promoting the aesthetic becomes part of the artworld, or 
(iv)an institution that promotes the aesthetic under limitations that do not apply to the 
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artworld” (Iseminger 2004, 102-103). and none of these competitive institutions promotes 
the aesthetic better than the artworld.  
 
The last claim that needs to be established is 3). To this end, Iseminger compared between 
various things that the artworld may do. Besides promoting the aesthetic, the artworld can 
also “provide fame, wealth, power, or social status in various ways for some of its members; 
it facilitates the promotion of various religious, moral, political, or philosophical beliefs, 
attitudes, or behavior, it provides means for self-expression and fosters craftsmanship and 
creativity” (Iseminger 2004, 103), and undoubtedly, some members of the artworld are 
motivated by “greed, the hunger for power, or the desire for fame or for social status” 
(Iseminger 2004, 103). However, Iseminger pointed out that “the artworld is not very 
dependable at providing these benefits for its members” since “only a few of them [members 
of the artworld] acquire riches, power, fame, or social status” (Iseminger 2004, 103) 
compared to its ability in promoting the aesthetic. Members of the artworld who act in their 
roles as artist, critics, and patrons sometimes see themselves as promoters of some religious, 
political, moral, or philosophical agenda, though this does not mean that the artworld is 
better at promoting such agenda. It is because of two reasons. First, an artifact many have 
multiple functions. For instance, a camera can be used to take photos and to hit people. 
However, the fact that someone uses a camera to hit others does not imply that a camera is 
better at hitting someone than taking photos. By the same token, the fact that some members 
of the artworld sometimes use the aesthetic as a mean to promote religious, political, moral, 
or philosophical aim does not imply that the artworld is better at promoting those things than 
at promoting the aesthetic.  
 
Second, if the aesthetic is able to contribute as a mean to promote religious, political, moral, 
or philosophical agenda, “such contribution is contingent on at least minimal aesthetic 
success” (Iseminger 2004, 104). At the same time, the success of promoting religious, 
political, moral, or philosophical aim is subject to and dependent on the aesthetic “power of 
art that art as a practice and the artworld as an institution” (Iseminger 2004, 104). The 
artworld can also provide for self-expression and creativity. Iseminger’s notion of aesthetic 
communication reinforces this Romantic theme, since the notion of aesthetic communication 
underlines the role of creator (artist), as well as the role of appreciator (audience) and the 
role of object (works of art) in the aesthetic. Thus, “to the extent that the practice of art is 
good at promoting aesthetic communication it will be good at promoting creativity in artist - 
those who, in making thing to be appreciated, also create works of art for an audience - and 
in so doing it will also promote self-expression” (Iseminger 2004, 105). However, Iseminger 
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commented that the artworld is not better at providing self-expression and creativity for two 
reasons. First, the kind of self-expression and creativity that artworld provides are limited, as 
some kinds of creativity, such as those exhibited by scientists, and some kinds of self-
expression, such as those exhibited by competitive athletes, are not particular fostered by art. 
“The kind of creativity and self-expression fostered by art is…specifically the kind exhibited 
in making of objects for appreciation (Iseminger 2004, 105). Second, providing self-
expression and creativity are only part of the whole story of aesthetic communication, and 
the “equally important parts are preserving and presenting works of art and building and 
providing for appropriate audifences” (Iseminger 2004, 105-106). The notion of aesthetic 
communication cannot be replaced by the notion of promoting creativity or/and the notion of 
self-expression, and the artworld is not better at providing creativity and self-expression than 
promoting the aesthetic. In conclusion, Iseminger believed that “it remains very plausible 
that the artworld is better at promoting the aesthetic than it is at other things if does or might 
do” (Iseminger 2004, 106). 
1.3. The Valuational Thesis 
In the previous sections, I have summarized some claims of Iseminger’s new aestheticism. 
However, one important claim remains unmentioned so far, namely, the valuational thesis 
(V’): “A work of art is a good work of art to the extent that it has the capacity to afford 
appreciation” (Iseminger 2004, 23). One advantage of traditional aestheticism in defining the 
concept of art is that the criterion of artistic value is followed from the function of art. 
Normally, if a concept is a functional one, we will value instances of the concept according 
to their capability in fulfilling the function. Thus, a thesis (FV) can be drawn from the above 
observation: “If something is a thing of certain kind if and only if it has a certain function, 
then it is a good thing of that kind if and only if is has the capacity to fulfill that function” 
(Iseminger 2004, 122). However, even with the help of (FV), the functional thesis (F’) does 
not imply the valuational thesis (V’). This is because the subjects of the two theses are 
different. Specifically, (F’) refers to the artworld, while (V’) refers to works of art. 
Therefore, Iseminger needed a principle that “distributes the function of a practice and its 
associated institution into its practitioners, their actions when they are acting in their 
institutional roles, and, most particularly for present purpose, the products of those actions” 
(Iseminger 2004, 122).  
 
Iseminger went on to explain the relation between i) institutional functions, ii) roles, and iii) 
products. The first notion is the institutional function, which can be understood as the thing 
that an institution is intended to and good at doing. For instance, the function of the 
Minnesota Humanities Commission is to “promote education in the humanities for those 
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who typically are not served by such traditional institutions as colleges and universities and 
with an emphasis on a particular kind of benefit to ‘public life” that at least some kinds 
education in some of the humanities may aspire to provide” (Iseminger 2004, 123). The 
second notion is the role, that is, the position and duty of a member within an institution. For 
instance, each member of the Minnesota Humanities Commission has his or her own role 
and act according to it. A program officer sets program for students who study in the 
institution, while a fund-raiser looks for sponsors. “Many different people serve in many 
different roles as participants in this institution [the Minnesota Humanities Commission]” 
(Iseminger 2004, 123), and they will be judged as better or worse according to the role that 
they serve in the institution. Thus, the criteria for judging for each member are different. For 
instance, a good program officer is not necessarily a good fund-raiser, and vice versa. 
Moreover, all actions of members in an institution follow a common criterion, namely, “does 
it help the institution to perform its function in the way that someone acting in the role is 
supposed to do” (Iseminger 2004, 124). The third notion is the product, which can be 
understood as a thing that is created by a member of an institution according to his or her 
role in the institution. On this, Iseminger mentioned that “the action of some of the members 
of the institution [the Minnesota Humanities Commission] is supposed to eventuate in 
products of one sort or another” (Iseminger 2004, 124). There are various products created 
by members acting in different roles in the Minnesota Humanities Commission, such as 
humanities programs or literacy programs, or a memo generated by the president of the 
Commission to move members to fulfill their own roles in the institution. Iseminger pointed 
out that when evaluating a product which is produced by a member of an institution acting in 
his or her institutional role, one needs not merely to consider the contribution that the 
product makes to the function of the institution. More importantly, one needs to consider 
whether the product “contributes to the institution’s fulfilling its function in a way 
appropriate to the role of its producer” (Iseminger 2004, 125). For instance, “a particular 
curricular package attracts the favorable attention of…a legislative committee by helping the 
Commission to get a larger appropriation from the state legislature does not make it a good 
curricular package” (Iseminger 2004, 125), because the function of a curricular package is to 
provide skills that require in the study of the humanities to students. If a particular curricular 
package does a bad job in helping students to acquire skills that are necessary for their study 
of the humanities but good at helping the Commission to get appropriation from the state 
legislature, it may still be considered a bad curricular package.  
In summary, Iseminger distributed the function of an institution to products of the institution 
with the help of three notions: 1) the notion of overarching function, 2) the notion of role 
function, and 3) the notion of product function. The overarching function refers to the 
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function of an institution, and is applicable universally to every party, including members, 
products, and actions of an institution. Every party of an institution serves this overarching 
function ultimately. In contrast, the role function refers to the function of members of an 
institution, and is applied relatively to every member of an institution. This is demonstrated 
by different people in an institution having to fulfill different functions according to their 
own role. Overarching function and role function are in a mean-end relation, and fulfilling 
the latter contributes to the fulfillment of the former. Specifically, some members in an 
institution fulfill their own role function in order to help the institution to fulfill the 
overarching function. Thus, role function contributes to overarching function, which takes 
the following form: If someone fulfills his or her own role function, then the person helps the 
institution to fulfill the overarching function. In this sense, the function of an institution is 
distributed among its members. In other words, someone contributes to the overarching 
function of the institution by fulfilling his or her own role function. The product function 
refers to the function of products of an institution, which applies relatively to every product 
of the institution. Different products in an institution may have to fulfill different functions 
according to the role function of their creators. Role function and product function are in a 
mean-end relation, and fulfilling the latter contributes to the fulfillment of the former. For 
instance, all products in an institution fulfill their own product function in order to help their 
creators (members of the institution) to fulfill the role function. Thus, product function 
contributes to role function, which takes the following form: If a product fulfills its own 
product function, then it helps its creator to fulfill his or her own role function. In this sense, 
the function of a member distributes to his or her product, and a product contributes to the 
role function of a member by fulfilling its own product function. Thus, the function of an 
institution distributes to its product through the transitive mean-end relation between 
overarching function, role function, and product function.  
 
From the previous discussion, Iseminger drew a new thesis: (FV’): “If an institution has a 
certain function, then something produced by someone acting in his or her role in that 
institution is good as a thing of the kind thus produced to the extent that is has the capacity to 
contribute to the function of that institution in the way appropriate to it as a thing of that 
kind” (Iseminger 2004, 126). However, (FV’) does not immediately establish the inference 
from (F’) to (V’). (FV’) is merely a conditional clause. Two more factual claims are required 
in order to establish the inference from (F’) to (V’), namely, to show that works of art are 
produced by someone acting his or her role in the artworld, and that works of art have the 
capacity to contribute to aesthetic communication. Given his thorough institutional account 
of art, Iseminger pointed out that “it is a straightforward consequence that works of art are 
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only produced within the context of an artworld” and “those who produce works of art are 
artist; it is their role in that institution to produce them [works of art]” (Iseminger 2004, 127). 
In this way, Iseminger established the first factual claim (K): “What is produced by an artist 
acting in his or her role in the artworld is a work of art” (Isminger 2004, 127). On the other 
hand, Iseminger mentioned that works of art are capable of affording appreciation, as they 
are artifacts that are made to be appreciated. Considering that this is one of the three 
elements that involves in an aesthetic communication, the second factual claim (C) can be 
established: “A work of art has the capacity to contribute to aesthetic communication in the 
way appropriate to it as a work of art to the extent that it has the capacity to afford 
appreciation” (Iseminger 2004, 128). Up to this point, “we can then instantiate (FV’), taking 
the artworld as the institution in question, the promotion of aesthetic communication as the 
function, works of art as the things produced, producing them as the role of artists in the 
artworld, and affording appreciation as their appropriate contribution as works of art to the 
function. Finally, from the resulting instantiation together with (F’), (K), and (C), there 
follows the desired conclusion: (V’) A work of art is a good work of art to the extent that it 
has the capacity to afford appreciation” (Iseminger 2004, 128-129). Even though (F’) is not a 
claim about the nature of art, the inference discussed herein still provides us with a principle 
of value in art, and thus, is in accord with our aesthetic institution to the traditional 
aestheticism.  
 
1.4. Advantage of Iseminger’s New Aestheticism 
The previous sections have provided detailed background information for me to answer the 
two questions mentioned in the final part of Chapter 1, namely, (1) what is the reason for 
choosing Iseminger’s new aestheticism instead of others, for instance Davies’ disjunctive 
definition and other versions of institutional definition, and (2) how does Iseminger’s new 
aestheticism satisfy Stecker’s view on the project of defining art. 
 
To answer question (1), I will compare Iseminger’s new aestheticism with Dickie’s 
institutional definition, Levinson’s historical definition, and Davies’ disjunctive definition 
separately. It is helpful to compare Iseminger’s account with Dickie’s account, since both are 
institutional. By comparison, Iseminger’s account is more preferable, because it is able to 
resolve the three problems in Dickie’s definition. First, Iseminger’s account solves the 
problem of the appearance of the initial arts (for instance, first art) and private arts. 
Iseminger claimed that the function of the artworld is to promote aesthetic communication, 
and the occasion of aesthetic communication “does not depend for its existence on the 
existence of the artworld or the existence of any facts that depend for their existence on the 
 
37 
existence of the artworld” (Iseminger 2004, 70). Further, “none of the concepts required 
explain what aesthetic communication is - human being, making, aiming, causing, 
appreciating (that is, valuing experiencing) - is primarily institutional” (Iseminger 2004, 70). 
Therefore, the appearance of initial arts does not require any artworld system or institutional 
framework, leaving room for the appearance of the initial arts.16 Moreover, it is at least 
theoretically possible that a person may create a work of art privately, that is, a person may 
create a work of art, even though that be the paradigmatic relation of aesthetic 
communication. Second, Iseminger’s account is informative enough for explaining the 
notion of the artworld and practice of art. Iseminger specified the function of the artworld, 
namely, promoting aesthetic communication, clearly by referring to the historical 
development of the Western Artworld: “the prospect of a practice’s being recognized as an 
artworld system will, to a large extent, be a function of the degree to which it comes to see 
itself and others come to see it as a practice of creating artifacts for appreciation” (Iseminger 
2015, 388). He even compared the artworld with other institutions, for instance the 
institution of natural appreciation, and explained the differences between them. Third, 
Iseminger’s account is able to avoid the circularity that is seen in Dickie’s account. As 
Iseminger mentioned in his recent paper, his version of institutional scheme can also be 
specified with five conditions:  
 
“ 1.  An artist is someone who participates with understanding the making of a work of art. 
  2’. A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public for 
       appreciation. 
  3’. An artworld public is a set of persons the members of which are prepared in some 
degree to 
       understand a work of art. 
  4’. The artworld is an informal institution whose function is the promotion of aesthetic  
       communication. 
  5’. Aesthetic communication is someone making an artifact with the aim and effect that 
someone  
       else appreciates it” (Iseminger 2015, 388). 
 
Conditions (4’) and (5’) are two of the central theses that Iseminger established in his book 
(Iseminger 2004), and Iseminger claimed that his version of institutional scheme “break[s] 
out of the circle of artistic concepts via the notion of aesthetic communication and the notion 
                                               
16 In using the term “the artworld” in his book, Iseminger mainly referred to the Western 
Artworld constructed by Charles Batteux, Jean d’Alembert, Denis Diderot, and others in the 
eighteenth century, with little regard for other artworlds. However, he admitted that “there 
have been and are worlds and practices in non-Western and indigenous cultures in the sense 
that there are worlds of painting, poetry, etc. in the West” (Iseminger 2004, 75).  
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of appreciation included in it” (Iseminger 2015, 388).It is clear that Iseminger’s scheme does 
not internally refer to and depend on each other, thus avoiding the circularity problem. 
 
Iseminger’s account is also preferable to Levinson’s historical account, because Iseminger 
provided an informative explanation on the state of first art, namely, through the functional 
thesis. According to Iseminger, the state of first art can be explained by its relation to a 
specific world or practice that functions to promote aesthetic communication. An artifact 
acquires the state of first art because it contributes to this specific world or practice, that is to 
say, the artifact is created with the aim and effect that it be appreciated or be valued in some 
way by someone. 
 
Finally, Iseminger’s account is preferable to Davies’ account, because the former combines 
both descriptive and normative aspects, while the latter mainly considers the descriptive 
aspect. The advantage of Iseminger’s functional thesis is that it implies a normative thesis, 
that is, the valuational thesis (V’), which helps to illuminate the point of art and tells us the 
correct way of evaluating a work of art. At the same time, the functional thesis is descriptive 
in nature, as Iseminger emphasized that the function of the artworld and the practice of art is, 
rather than should be, to promote aesthetic communication. By appealing to the notion of the 
artworld and also the institution scheme, Iseminger was somehow able to account for 
individual works that are anti-aesthetic. As a result, Iseminger’s account is able to account 
for most, if not all, instances of works of art, showing that it is a combination of both the 
descriptive and normative aspects. In contrast, Davies’ disjunctive account is relatively lack 
of normative concern. It is without doubt that Davies also referred to the functional aspect of 
art in his definition, since one of his three disjunctive clauses is related to the function of art. 
However, this does not mean that Davies’ account also implies a valuational thesis, because 
Davies’ account is disjunctive in nature, something is considered a work of art because (a) it 
fulfils an aesthetic function, or (b) it falls into certain art form or art tradition, or (c) it is 
intended by its creator to be art and is presented with certain necessary and appropriate mean 
to realize this intention. That is to say, not all works of art function to fulfil an aesthetic goal. 
Thus, further premises are needed here in order to infer a valuational thesis for this 
functional clause.17  
 
                                               
17 Iseminger also agreed that not all works of art has an aesthetic function. However, he 
further established premises (FV’), (F’), (K), and (C), and thereby concluded that works of 
art should be evaluated according to the fulfilment of its aesthetic function. 
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To answer question (2), I will explain how Iseminger combined the four different aspects, 
namely, historical, institutional, intentional, and functional aspects, through his explanation 
of the notion. It is quite clear that Iseminger’s notion of the artworld is institutional, since it 
was built on Danto’s and Dickie’s institutional proposal. It is also historical, since 
Iseminger’s artworld involves the historical developments and changes, as he noted that “the 
Western artworld and practice of art had come into existence, presumably… as it certainly 
has to this day continued to existed, to be maintained, and to be modified as a result of the 
intentional action if its members” (Iseminger 2004, 91). Iseminger also took into account the 
artist’s intention to a certain degree, as seen from his notion of aesthetic communication that 
“involves somebody designing and making” (Iseminger 2004, 26). Finally, his functional 
thesis clearly specifies the function of the artworld and the practice of art. 
 
1.5. Problem with Iseminger’s Notion of Appreciation 
The notion of appreciation is the most fundamental component of Iseminger’s new 
aestheticism, as it helps to distinguish aesthetic state of mind from other non-aesthetic states 
of mind. However, his notion of appreciation is not able to account for experiences that are 
intended to be negative, and thus, it is also not able to account for institutions that are 
intended to afford negative aesthetic communication. I consider this an inadequacy of new 
aestheticism, as not all instances that we consider to be aesthetically relevant are covered, 
and not all institutions of art are accounted for. 
 
One may immediately recall a similar objection made by Carroll (Carroll 2012), who pointed 
out that Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is not able to account for negative aesthetic 
experiences. Carroll considered it nonsense to claim that someone values a bad experience 
for its own sake, since “disvaluing does not seem to be an idea that we can conjoin 
coherently with the formula ‘for its own sake’” (Carroll 2012, 166). Recalling Iseminger’s 
notion of appreciation, which states that “Appreciation is finding the experience of a state of 
affairs to be valuable in itself” (Iseminger 2004, 36). As I summarized in Section 4.1.2, 
Iseminger’s notion of appreciation involves two conceptually distinctive parts: i) an 
experiential component, and ii) a mental state of valuing an experience component for its 
own sake. Carroll pointed out in his objection that the two parts of Iseminger’s notion of 
appreciation seemingly involves a time order, that is, part ii) happens after part i). In other 
words, a person has a direct experience of a state of affairs first, and then the person decides 
to value it for its own sake. This means that a person may have already known that the 
experience is a bad experience during the direct experiencing (part i), and therefore the 
person does not value the bad experience for its own sake (part ii). However, it is not clear 
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that Iseminger’s notion of aesthetic appreciation implies such a time order. In explaining the 
sort of beliefs that is involved in aesthetic appreciation, Iseminger claimed that “it 
[evaluative belief] is a belief about a particular experience one is engaged in or has had, and 
the belief will turn out to be true—that one will find the experience valuable in itself, that is 
one will appreciate the state of affairs experienced” (Iseminger 2005, 106). It seems that the 
evaluative beliefs involved in part ii) are not necessarily beliefs from past experiences. 
Rather, Iseminger believed that some, if not all, evaluative beliefs are beliefs about 
forthcoming experiences. That is to say, some, if not all, evaluative beliefs are further 
beliefs. For instance, if someone has a belief (hope or expectation) that his life will be 
“better, all things being equal, for his scanning or having scanned this picture” (Iseminger 
2005, 106) and he does scan the picture, then he is having aesthetic appreciation according to 
Iseminger’s proposal. Therefore, it is not correct in saying that Iseminger’s account “seems 
to imply that aesthetic experiences are always positive”. (Carroll  2012, 166). It is possible 
that a person expects or hopes that the experience of listening to a piece of music will make 
his life “better, all thing being equal”, but his expectation or hope fails to realize, since he 
finds that the experience have not made his life “better, all thing being equal”. In this case, 
the person still has an aesthetic state of mind according to Iseminger’s notion of 
appreciation, even though his experiential component is negative. To put this into 
perspective, consider someone listening to a symphony and having a belief that his/her life 
will be better, all things being equal, for his/her listening or having listened to the symphony. 
In this case, the person experiences a negative aesthetic experience since (i) the experience is 
actually negative; and (ii) the person values the experience for its own sake (has a belief that 
his/her life will be better, all things being equal, for his/her listening or having listened to the 
symphony). Iseminger’s account is advantageous for being able to account for this kind of 
negative aesthetic experience. 
 
It is arguable that Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is able to account for negative aesthetic 
experiences of failed works of art. However, lseminger’s proposal is not able to account for 
experiences of works of art that are intended to afford negative aesthetic experiences, such as 
ugly arts. It is strange, if not irrational, to have a belief that the experience of those works 
will make one’s life “better, all things being equal”, because those works are artifacts created 
intentionally by someone. Therefore it seems plausible to claim that there is a relation 
between the creator’s intentions and the artifact’s properties. Normally, we expect that the 
properties of an artifact would be partly determined by the creator’s intentions, without 
ruling out the possibility that there may be some accidental properties, as Livingston 
reminded us that the appearances of some properties of works of art may be unintended and 
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accidental (Livingston 2005b). It is also possible that a creator fails to realize his intentions 
in creating an artifact. For instance, an artist may intend to create a work of art that affords 
negative aesthetic experience but somehow fails to do so, and his work turns out to afford 
positive aesthetic experience. However, it is still strange, if not irrational, to believe or hope 
that an artifact of this kind may afford good aesthetic experience to its appreciators, because 
this is an abnormal situation in which a creator has failed to realize his intentions in the 
creation process. Imagine that someone who wants to have a positive aesthetic experience, 
but he appreciates a work of art that is intended to afford negative experience, claiming that 
his action is based on an expectation that the artist of the work has failed to realize his 
intentions. Such expectation can be deemed irrational.  
 
This unveils two problems in Iseminger’s notion of appreciation. The first is that Iseminger’s 
notion of appreciation is not able to account for all aesthetically relevant states of mind, 
specifically, negative aesthetic experiences that are intentionally afforded by some works of 
art. A failed work may afford a tedious experience to appreciators, while a work that is 
intended to afford a tedious experience may also afford a tedious experience to appreciators. 
The content of these two experiences are highly similar, and we apply the same aesthetic 
term, “tedious”, to both of them. Thus, it seems arbitrary to say that the former experience is 
an aesthetic one but not the latter one. The second problem, derived from the first problem, 
is that new aestheticism fails to account for some practices of art, such as those that aims to 
promote negative aesthetic experience, for example, ugly arts, which some artists, such as 
Laura Owens, participate in. One may challenge this objection as a non-decisive one, since 
a) the existence of those institutions or practices is debatable, and b) even if those institutions 
or practices do exist, Iseminger can exclude those institutions or practices from the 
artworld18. Nevertheless, even if the second problem does not hold, the first problem is still 
enough to render Iseminger’s notion of appreciation inadequate. 
 
2. Summary of neo-Lewisian Proposal 
To circumvent the two problems in Iseminger’s notion of appreciation, I propose replacing it 
with neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension, which brings two advantages: i) the notion 
of value-apprehension is able to account for intended negative aesthetic experience and 
therefore is able to account for practices of ugly arts; ii) the notion of value-apprehension 
provides a basis for further value-judgments. The following section is a review of neo-
Lewisian notion of value-apprehension.   
                                               
18 Iseminger has to make such an exclusion, because what I am talking here are institutions 




2.1. Neo-Lewisian Notion of Value-Apprehension 
This section aims to discuss neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension. In his book An 
Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Lewis proposed the notion of value-apprehension for 
explaining the concept of aesthetic experience. Lewis outlined two notions of aesthetic 
experience - the broad one and the narrow one. Accordingly, there are two notions of value-
apprehension - the broad one and the narrow one.  
 
Livingston commented that Lewis’ overall proposal is a hybrid one that combines the 
axiological and the content-oriented approach of aesthetic experience.19 It is an axiological 
approach because Lewis appealed to the notion of value, more specifically, intrinsic value, in 
defining the notion of aesthetic experience. Such value-valences can be positive or negative, 
and form the basis for further esthetic judgments. At the same time, it is a content-oriented 
approach, because Lewis claimed that aesthetic experiences are direct to existents that are 
inherent valuable. The following outlines Livingston’s neo-Lewisian notion of value-
appehension (Livingston 2004, 2005a), which is constructed on top of Lewis’ original notion 
of value-apprehension. 
 
2.2. Lewis’ Broad Notion of Aesthetic Experience 
This section is a discussion of Lewis’ broad notion of aesthetic experience. Lewis claimed 
that “in a broad and literal sense, all direct apprehensions are esthetic” (Lewis 1946, 439). 
The term “apprehensions” refers to the notion of value-apprehension, which in turn refers to 
a special sort of experiences, namely, the “value and disvalue” sort of experiences. This sort 
of experiences is distinctive because of the appearance of a sort of qualities - value-valences 
- in the content of those experiences. 
 
2.2.1. The Notion of Value-Valence 
In claiming that an experience is valuable, Lewis regarded people as actually saying that the 
experience has value-valences in its content. Value-valences are qualities that appear in an 
experience that are similar to other qualities, for instance, colour qualities, that appear in an 
experience.20 If someone says that her experience of listening to a piece of music is good, 
she is reporting her value apprehension. Value apprehension is not a form of judgment. It 
                                               
19 For the classification of different approaches of aesthetic experience, one may refer to 
Carroll’s paper (Carroll 2002b). 




can be reported correctly or wrongly, but it cannot be wrong in itself. In other words, one can 
wrongly report her bad feeling of listening to a piece of music, but the feeling of bad itself 
cannot be false.  
 
There are two kinds of value-valence: 1) immediate value-valence, and 2) non-immediate 
value-valence. The appearance of immediate value-valence depends solely on the presented 
content of an experience without consideration of further consequences. For instance, the 
experience of listening to Symphony No. 41 may be valuable solely because its presented 
content is good. In contrast, the appearance of non-immediate value-valence depends solely 
on further consequences but not the presented content of an experience. For instance, the 
experience of listening to Symphony No. 41 may be valuable solely because it helps someone 
pass an examination. The two kinds of value-valences are compatible with each other. For 
instance, the experience of listening to Symphony No. 41 may be valuable because its 
presented content is good and it helps someone pass an examination. One may name the 
former kind of value-valence intrinsic value-valence, and the latter instrumental value-
valence. Lewis did not employ a particular name, such as good or like, to characterize 
immediate value-valence, because any particular name only characterizes a single and 
unique of occasion of the immediate value-valence, but in fact, immediate value-valence is a 
general notion that includes all single and unique occasions. Therefore, one may give 
instances of immediate value-valence any name, but the notion of immediate value-valence 
is not identical to any of them. In summary, Lewis concluded that any term or expression is 
too narrow to capture the diversity of value modalities, and we should conjure up the 
requisite inclusive sense of any chosen name.  
 
In addition to this, Lewis also distinguished value-valences from our affects toward an 
experience. Our desire and aversion are not identical to value-valences. Rather, they are 
caused by value-valences: “Value-disvalue is that mode or aspect of the given or the 
contemplated to which desire and aversion are addressed; and it is that by apprehension of 
which the inclination to action is normally elicited” (p. 403). Livingston also mentioned that 
Lewis’ axiological account should not be considered as a reductive affect theory (Livingston 
2004). Even though Livingston agreed that “various sorts of pleasure and displeasure are 
often (but not always) correlated with positive and negative aesthetic experiences” 
(Livingston 2004, 387), those effects “are symptoms, but not a logical condition of such 
valenced experiences” (Livingston 2004, 387). According to Carroll’s classification, Lewis’ 
proposal is an object version of the axiological approach (Carroll 2001a). It is because Lewis 
appealed to the value-valence, which appears objectively in an aesthetic experience, but not 
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our state of mind, for instance, our subjective beliefs of the value of an aesthetic experience, 
when defining aesthetic experiences.  
 
2.2.2. The Notion of Direct Experiencing  
The concept of experience in Lewis’ proposal is a phenomenological one described as 
“something that seems a certain way to its subject” (Iseminger 2004, 36). It is clear that 
Lewis referred to the phenomenological content of an experience when explaining his notion 
of value-apprehension, and the thing that is outlined is the value-valences. Experiencing may 
be, but is not necessarily, a sensory matter. For instance, listening to Symphony No. 41 is an 
instance of experiencing, which is a sensory matter, as is reading Dos Passos’ U.S.A. 
Moreover, the kind of experiencing invoked here must be a direct one. That is, one has to 
personally listen to Symphony No. 41 in order to claim that she has direct experiencing of the 
work. In contrast, some may hold that one can have indirect experiencing of Symphony No. 
41 by listening to a report of someone who has direct experiencing of the work. 
 
2.2.3. The Notion of Inherent Value 
The aesthetic experience is not merely intrinsically valuable, but is also direct to inherent 
valuable objects. Livingston mentioned that Lewis’ proposal follows from W. D. Ross’ 
influential thesis (Livingston 2004), in which Ross proposed that beauty is not a form of 
intrinsic value. Rather, the value of beauty resides in its power to occasion an intrinsically 
valuable experience - aesthetic experience, which Ross called the aesthetic enjoyment. In 
other words, a beautiful object only has instrumental value, and there is no beauty in a 
mindless world. This line of thought is called the experiential approach, which holds that the 
value of beautiful object is determined by the intrinsic value of the experience that the object 
offers (Iseminger 2008). Livingston reconstructed Ross thesis as follows: “An object’s 
beauty or aesthetic value is its power to occasion an aesthetic experience” (Livingston, 2004, 
380).  
 
In his proposal, which is developed based on Ross’ thesis, Lewis introduced the notion of 
inherent value to account for Ross’ notion of aesthetic value. He further clarified the mode of 
experiencing that is required for having an aesthetic experience. Specifically, an aesthetic 
experience has to be a direct experience, which means that a person must be in touch with an 
inherently valuable object, and a person has to directly experience through the presentation 
of that object in that experience. In other words, one has to perceive an inherently valuable 
object by herself, instead of simply hearing about it from others or reading some second-
hand sources. In addition, the presence of an inherently valuable object is required for having 
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an aesthetic experience. In summary, Lewis’ thesis can be stated as follows: “Inherent value 
is an object’s power to occasion an intrinsically valued experience through the presentation 
of that object in that experience” (Livingston 2004, 381). Lewis’ additional clause helps to 
exclude certain unacceptable consequences. Consider a hallucinatory mushroom. It may be 
able to cause beautiful hallucination, even if a real-life mushroom is visually uninteresting 
and odorless. Anyone who ingests this mushroom may experience it as visually beautiful and 
fragrant. However, according to Lewis, the hallucination is not an aesthetic experience, 
because a real-life mushroom is not present in the hallucination (Livingston 2004). An object 
that appears in a beautiful hallucination stems from a person’s own altered perceptions and 
sensation, and the appearance of the object in the hallucination is different from the real one. 
Therefore, aesthetic value is not attributed to hallucinations, since “the traditional wisdom is 
that the latter [aesthetic value of an object] would have to do with… looks, smell, or tastes, 
and not the qualities of illusions to which it has made a causal contribution” (Livingston 
2004, 380-381). Lewis’ proposal is able to rule out hallucinations, because “the valued, 
hallucinatory experience does not involve any direct apprehension… and instead bears only 
a non-cognitive, causal connection to it (via the event of… ingestion)” (Livingston 2004, 
381).   
 
2.3. The Narrow Notion of Value-Apprehension  
In the previous paragraph, I outlined Lewis’ broad notion of aesthetic experience. This 
paragraph is a discussion on Lewis’ narrow notion of aesthetic experience. Lewis attempted 
to “isolate aesthetic value as a proper subset of inherent value” (Livingston 2004, 382), and 
claimed that this narrow notion only considers aesthetic experiences related to “common 
human interests”. He noticed that the conceptual demarcations in aesthetic theory are vague 
when he observed that there are items that people tend to agree and consider as paradigm 
aesthetic items, but there is still a “large class with respect to which no such agreement will 
be found” (Lewis 1946, 435). Moreover, even within those uncontroversial paradigm 
aesthetic items, there is no “corresponding unanimity as to the basis of them. Insofar as this 
is the case, any delimitation of the aesthetic as one class of values must be in some measure 
arbitrary” (Lewis 1946, 435).  
  
Lewis summarized three conditions for the narrow notion of aesthetic experience at the end 
of the fourteenth chapter of his book, though in Livingston’s view, they are actually eight 
conceptually distinct conditions (Livingston 2004). The following discussion is on 
Livingston’s classification, based on Lewis’ summary and relevant discussion in his 




(I): “Aesthetic objects are those the value of which is an inherent goodness, consisting in a 
potentiality for affording satisfaction in the presentation of them. Further, this must be their 
preponderant quality and not too much mixed up with merely instrumental value. Also, in 
order to be accounted good on the whole, independently of any utility, it is not sufficient that 
the object should afford some incidental and occasional direct gratification: this potentiality 
must be a distinctive and reliable character of it, and possessed in high degree” (Lewis 1946, 
455);  
 
(II): “Aesthetic objects are marked off by reference to the manner of our typical orientation 
toward them. They must be capable of soliciting and rewarding that attentive regard to the 
presented quality of them which is the aesthetic attitude; and not such as, by their sign-
significance of further portending experience, distract us from contemplation and turn us 
away toward action” (Lewis 1946, 455-456); 
 
(III): “Peculiarly aesthetic things are subject to the moralistic consideration that they should 
be an afford gratification which are pure and the good of them enduring, and are spiritual in 
the sense of being non-competitive goods, the value of which is not divided in being shared” 
(Lewis 1946, 456). 
 
On the other hand, Livingston’s classification is as follows:  
 
“An experience is aesthetic just in case it (L1) is valued intrinsically or for its own sake; (L2) 
has a positive value; (L3) manifests a high degree of this intrinsic or final value; (L4) has a 
final value that is preponderant in relation to whatever instrumental value it may have; (L5) 
corresponds to the distinctive character of some external object and is indicative of that 
object’s reliable and distinctive power to give rise to such experiences; (L6) is an absorbed 
and active contemplation of the object; (L7) has contents that are not a matter of possessive; 
or, (L8) competitive attitudes” (Livingston 2004, 385).  
 
In defining the broad notion of aesthetic experience, Lewis did not merely refer to the 
phenomenal content, but also the value character (potentiality) of object and the status of 
appreciators, such as their mood. Therefore, some conditions in Livingston’s classification 
also refer to the character of object and the status of appreciators. One should be aware of the 
subject of each condition. 
 
(L1) This condition refers to Lewis’ notion of intrinsic value-valence in his broad notion of 
aesthetic experience. Livingston claimed that “Lewis’ most general assumption is the 
axiological clause requiring that aesthetic experiences be instantiations of inherent value” 
(Livingston 2004, 383). As discussed before, inherent value is an object’s power to occasion 
an intrinsically valued experience through the presentation. This point is also made in Lewis’ 
own summary: “Aesthetic objects are those the value of which is an inherent goodness, 
consisting in a potentiality for affording satisfaction in the presentation of them” (Lewis 
1946, 455). In claiming that aesthetic experiences are instantiations of inherent value, 
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Livingston was defining the phenomenal content of an experience, which is intrinsically 
valuable (or affording satisfaction in Lewis’ summary (I)).  
 
(L2) This condition refers to the phenomenal content of an experience. In Lewis’ broad 
notion of aesthetic experience, the intrinsic valence of an experience can either be positive or 
negative. However, he claimed that the intrinsic valence of an experience must be positive in 
his narrow notion of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experiences in narrow sense must carry 
“satisfaction”, “gratification”, or some similar positive valence. Lewis apparently did not 
consider it cogent to say, for example, that one’s engagement with some insipid and 
annoying music could constitute “an aesthetic experience having an intrinsic, negative 
valence” (Livingston 2004, 383), as he believed there is no negative aesthetic experience. 
 
(L3) This condition is an extension of (L2). It refers to the phenomenal content of an 
experience, and further stipulates that the intrinsic value of aesthetic experiences must be 
“possessed in high degree” in the narrow sense. In other words, there is no mildly positive 
aesthetic experience in Lewis’ view. 
 
(L4) This condition refers to the phenomenal content of an experience, and stipulates “the 
relative weight of types of value involved in the experience” (Livingston 2004, 383). Lewis 
believed that intrinsic value-valence and instrument value-valence are compatible, and 
aesthetic experience may be “mixed up with merely instrumental value”. However, he 
claimed that intrinsic value-valence must be “preponderant quality” in the narrow notion of 
aesthetic experience, and aesthetic experiences in the narrow nation are “not too much mixed 
up with merely instrumental value”. As pointed out by Livingston, “for Lewis, an aesthetic 
experience cannot be overshadowed by practical concerns” (Livingston 2004, 383). 
 
(L5) This condition refers to the character of an object. In the narrow notion, not only are 
aesthetic experiences not merely occurred by potentiality of an object, the potentiality also 
“must be a distinctive and reliable character” of the object. According to Lewis, aesthetic 
experiences are “more than the manifestation of some object’s incidental or occasional 
contribution to an intrinsically valued experience” (Livingston 2004, 383).  
 
(L6) This condition refers to the appreciators’ status. Lewis discussed two different attitudes 
relevant to having aesthetic experience: i) aesthetic attitude, and ii) contemplation. Although 
Lewis used the term “aesthetic attitude” in his discussion of the narrow notion of aesthetic 
experience, he did not in fact adopt an aesthetic attitude theory (Livingston 2004), as told by 
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his own words: “And although all experience is aesthetic in the broad sense of being 
presentation of some quality-complex in which value or disvalue is directly findable, it 
becomes aesthetic in the narrower sense which is more appropriate, only if it becomes object 
[sic] of the aesthetic attitude; only if the experience is marked by absorption in the presented 
content on its own account” (Lewis 1946, 439). Livingston considered the latter part of the 
quotation as evidence that “it is the result or content, not the adoption of a stance or attitude, 
which contributes to the difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences” 
(Livingston 2004, 384).  
 
In general, proponents of the attitude approach claim that it is necessary to adopt a special 
attitude for having aesthetic experience. There are various attitude theories. For instance, 
Jerome Stolnitz and Eliseo Vivas defined aesthetic attitude as “disinterested and sympathetic 
attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone” 
(Dickie 1964, 68). Unlike those proponents, Lewis considered the adoption of an aesthetic 
attitude as neither necessary nor sufficient for having aesthetic experience. It is not necessary 
because an aesthetic experience can occur spontaneously “in the absence of any intentional 
adoption of a special attitude” (Livingston 2004, 384), and it is not sufficient because “the 
successful adoption of some special attitude [doesn’t] guarantee that an aesthetic experience 
follows” (Livingston 2004, 384). Lewis noted that there is nothing in the aesthetic attitude 
that is constitutive of what is apprehended, or aesthetic value. The aesthetic attitude is simply 
a label for those experiences in which the agent’s awareness is effectively “absorbed” (p. 
440) in the presented content for its own sake, and the decisive reason why many 
intrinsically-valenced experiences do not count as aesthetic experiences in the narrow sense 
is that they do not satisfy this latter clause” (Livingston 2004, 384). Instead of adopting an 
aesthetic attitude, Lewis believed that aesthetic experience “has to arise in and through an 
absorbed attention to the presented content” (Livingston 2004, 384). Livingston called this 
the focus and content condition. 
 
The condition requires appreciator’s “attentive regard to the presented quality” of an 
inherently valuable object. According to Lewis, aesthetic experience is contemplative in the 
narrow sense. “Whatever the object may signify or mean with regard to future possible 
experience must not ‘distract us from contemplation" (Lewis 1946, 456)’” (Livingston 2004, 
385). However, Livingston admitted that the meaning of contemplation is not clear in Lewis’ 
original proposal. It is possible that Lewis was making reference to D. W. Prall’s view on 
contemplation, which emphasizes the active nature of contemplation: “full attentive activity 
summoning the most elaborate nerve and brain and muscle processes to its aid” (Prall 1929, 
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11). Nevertheless, Livingston reminded us that “this emphasis on activity should not be 
conflated with the idea that contemplation must be the result of the deliberate adoption of a 
special attitude or stance. The point, rather, is that contemplation requires some degree of 
engagement with, and attention to the presented objects or events” (Livingston 2004, 385). 
Active contemplation is neither necessary nor sufficient for having aesthetic experiences. It 
is not necessary because passive contemplation can also give rise to an aesthetic experience 
spontaneously, and it is not sufficient because intrinsic value-valences are required for 
having aesthetic experience, and they cannot simply be willed by the agent (Livingston 
2005a).  
 
(L7) & (L8): This pair of conditions refers to the appreciators’ status that Lewis called a 
“moralistic” consideration: “the desire of exclusive possession and the urges of competitive 
activity spoil esthetic satisfaction” (Lewis 1946, 449), and the objects of aesthetic 
gratifications are “non-competitive goods, the value of which is not divided in being shared” 
(Lewis 1946, 456). Lewis viewed the aesthetic experience as “serene” and “free from 
practical care” (Lewis 1946, 450), and this requires the attitude of “contemplative 
discernment”. He further claimed that the attitude is incompatible with “any interest too 
easily affected by considerations of meum and tuum” (Lewis 1946, 449), and a person is not 
able to have aesthetic experience “as long as competitive and possessive attitudes 
predominate” (Livingston 2004, 385). Lewis introduced two attitudes here: i) possessive 
attitude, and ii) rivalrous attitude, both of which are incompatible with aesthetic experience. 
Lewis grouped the two attitudes under a single condition, but Livingston remarked that the 
two attitudes are independent of each other: “Someone’s possessive attitude or relation to 
some object need not involve that person in a competition with anyone, nor does it entail any 
rivalrous attitudes. Also, some competitive interests are compatible with non-possessive, 
shared experiential values” (Livingston 2004, 385).  
 
2.4. Livingston’s Neo-Lewisian Notion of Value-Apprehension 
Although Livingston concurred with Lewis’ proposal of the broad notion of value 
apprehension, he did not agree with all conditions proposed by Lewis for the narrow notion 
of value apprehension. Specifically, Livingston rejected conditions (L2), (L3), (L5), and 
(L8), the reason for which will be discussed in this section. 
 
Livingston considered (L2) and (L3) honorific clauses that refer to an honorific nation of 
aesthetic experience. He rejected them for two reasons: i) Livingston aimed to set up a non-
honorific, classificational notion of aesthetic experience (Livingston 2004); ii) Livingston 
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regarded it to be arbitrary to exclude negative or mildly positive aesthetic experiences in his 
narrow account. Livingston considered it possible and useful to promote a relatively neutral, 
classificatory concept of aesthetic experience, because negative aesthetic experience may 
somehow contribute to our apprehension of positive aesthetic experience: “After all, part of 
the sense and importance of describing one’s experience of some music as a positive 
aesthetic experience is its implicit or explicit contrast to other, negatively valenced yet 
similar cases” (Livingston 2004, 389). He further pointed out that Lewis made no 
justification for building the honorific status into the narrow account of aesthetic experience. 
Livingston claimed that there are a large part of a negative vocabulary that “has at least a 
prima-facie application in aesthetics: ‘irritating’, ‘tedious’, ‘irksome’, ‘revolting’, 
‘hackneyed’, ‘clumsy’, ‘dull’, and so on” (Livingston 2004, 388).  
 
Livingston rejected (L5) because he believed that this condition “opens the door to an 
epistemological objection” (Livingston 2004, 389) due to Lewis’ failure to provide 
sustainable distinction to help distinguish between characters that are reliable and distinctive 
and other characters. Lewis claimed that the aesthetic value of an object is its power to occur 
aesthetic experiences through the direct presentation. Aesthetic experiences are our direct 
apprehensions of the object’s presented content, and they are immediate and non-reflective 
apprehensions. Therefore, the inherent value of an object is not identical to and cannot be 
provided by any particular aesthetic experience. Rather, it is identical to the general and 
summation of all particular aesthetic experiences that it may occur. In Lewis’ own words, 
judgments on an object’s inherent value are non-terminated judgments, while judgments of 
any particular value-apprehension are terminated judgments. The latter kind of judgment can 
be verified while the conditional clause is fulfilled. For instance, one may make a judgement 
that person A will enjoy the experience of listening to Symphony No. 41. The judgement can 
be verified by performing Symphony No. 41 to person A and asking about her feeling. In 
contrast, in claiming that Symphony No. 41 is inherently valuable, we are saying that anyone 
who listens to the work will enjoy the experience of listening to it. The quantitative 
indicators of the two sorts of judgments are different, and no particular terminated judgment 
can provide any immediate, reliable indication of the object’s overall inherent value. The 
object’s overall inherent value can only be indicated by the summation of all terminated 
judgments. Moreover, aesthetic experiences are somehow dispositional, and directly value-
apprehensions of an object can vary according to different people. Suppose John duly 
contemplates a picture and finds the result immensely favorable, while Kin Hei’s result of  
contemplating the same picture is merely mildly positive, “which reaction is a response to 
the work’s reliable and distinct character or power, and is therefore an aesthetic experience” 
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(Livingston 2004, 389). In conclusion, no particular aesthetic experience can “offer an 
immediate, non-reflective grounding of a more general judgement concerning an object’s 
distinctive and reliable aesthetic value” (Livingston 2004, 389), and this condition makes the 
“application of the distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experiences depend on 
indirect criteria and judgements (Lewis 1946, 465)” (Livingston 2004, p. 389). Lewis 
noticed this problem, and he “ends up making the surprising concession that there is no such 
thing as ‘the value’ of a work or object”, but “various modes of assessment” (Lewis 1946, 
529–530), and he admitted that human experience is “not the exclusive standard” (Lewis 
1946, 531)’ (Livingston 2004, 390). However, Lewis’ action seemed to have completely 
destroyed his anti-relativist promise of aesthetic value of objects. 
 
Livingston considered (L8) unacceptable, because i) Lewis did not provide a positive 
argument for this condition (Livingston 2004), and ii) competitive attitudes are grounded in 
some aesthetic experiences. However, Livingston proposed a thought experiment that may 
probably support (L8), as follows: Consider the case of Paolo, whose son is a pianist 
performing in a competition, and his performance is successful. Paolo has an “intensely 
gratifying experience” toward his son’s performance (Livingston 2004, 388). However, one 
may argue that Paolo’s experience is not aesthetic, because his enjoyment is derived mainly 
from the success of his own son rather than the presented content of the performance, or, as 
Livingston put it, “his enjoyment derives largely if not entirely from the performance’s 
features as apprehended in relation to the father’s competitive attitudes” (Livingston 2004, 
388). Other audience who do not know Paolo’s son may not experience the same kind of 
enjoyment. In this case, Livingston concluded that “the exclusion of the father’s response 
could be warranted by the interest in an aesthetic concept attuned to relevant, common 
interests” (Livingston 2004, 388). However, (L8) is still unconvincing because some 
instances of aesthetic experience involve competitive attitudes. It is not clear that we should 
expect “the intrinsic rewards of all competitive games, as well as fictions about competitive 
activities, to be excluded from the sphere of aesthetic experience” (Livingston 2004, 388). 
For instance, some claim that experience of playing computer games with a competitive 
dimension can be aesthetic. Therefore, Livingston concluded that “Lewis’ remarks to the 
effect that such experiences are not ‘serene’ and are inimical to ‘contemplative discernment’ 
seem unconvincing, and insufficient to justify a sweeping exclusion of the pleasures of real 
and imaginary agonistic situations” (Livingston 2004, 388). As for Paolo’s case, Livingston 
proposed invoking (L7), thereby concluding that Paolo’s experience is non-aesthetic, 
because “the father’s appreciation of the performance is vitiated by a possessive attitude, 
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since the primary object of his enjoyment is the fact that it is his son’s success” (Livingston 
2004, 388). 
 
Livingston in fact agreed with Lewis on (L7) in an earlier paper (Livingston 2004), but 
decided to change his mind later on (Livingston 2005a). In the paper “C. I. Lewis and the 
Outline of Aesthetic Experience”, Livingston claimed that Lewis did not provide any 
positive argument for condition (L7). However, “examples motivating the non-possessive 
condition can be evoked” (Livingston 2004, 387), as in the example of a miser: “Consider 
Harpagon, who finds great intrinsic value in dwelling over the many gold coins he has 
hoarded. His attention is clearly absorbed by the coins, and he enjoys both the coins, and his 
experience of acquiring and owning them, predominantly, if not exclusively, for their own 
sake. Harpagon is hardly alone in being ruled by this sort of passion, and his experience 
would seem to correspond to a reliable potential of the object of his desire: shimmering gold 
coins are precisely the sort of possession misers find it rewarding to contemplate” 
(Livingston 2004, 387-388). However, enjoyments of ownership are not paradigmatic cases 
of aesthetic experience, and these kinds of enjoyment are seemingly unrelated to human 
common interest. Therefore, Livingston concluded that (L7) should be held in the neo-
Lewisian nation of aesthetic experience. But in a later paper “Aesthetic Experience and a 
Belletristic Definition of Literature” (Livingston 2005a), Livingston put forward a case in 
which a person finds intrinsic value in the acquisition of different objects. The person 
contemplates the event of acquisition itself, and he does not desire those objects as means to 
any other ends. In this case, “the object of his intrinsically delightful contemplation is the 
coming into being of that relational property which he can designate as ‘now newly owned 
by me’” (Livingston 2005a, 44). This mode of value-apprehension seems to fit well with 
Lewis’ notion of inherent value and narrow nation of aesthetic experience, making it 
arbitrary to rule them out. As a result, Livingston accepted those cases as instances of 
aesthetic experience and “br[oke] quite sharply with some of the hand-me-down proposals 
about aesthetic concepts” (Livingston 2005a, 44). Nonetheless, he reminded us that his target 
is merely to construct a classificatory, non-honorific notion of aesthetic experience, and this 
account “has to do with what people effectively value and not what they ought to value, or 
value for good reason” (Livingston 2005a, 45). Those cases can be treated as aesthetic 
experience with relatively low value, and this would not cause any problem to a 
classificatory, non-honorific notion, since such notion “allow[s] that not all experiences 
which are aesthetic ones effectively possess the virtue of being grounded in, and 
instantiating, the object’s actual aesthetic value–or the value it would have for a model or 




In conclusion, Livingston’s neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension proposes that: An 
experience is aesthetic just in case (1) it has intrinsic value-valence; (2) its intrinsic or final 
value is preponderant in relation to whatever instrumental value it may also have; and, (3) it 
is an absorbed and active contemplation of the object (Livingston 2004, p.391-392). 
 
3. Differences between Iseminger’s Notion of Appreciation and Neo-Lewisian Notion of 
Value-Apprehension 
The differences between neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension and Iseminger’s notion 
of appreciation will be discussed in this section. There are two major differences between the 
notions. First, neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is a phenomenological one, while 
Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is an epistemic one. Phenomenological accounts 
characterize aesthetic experiences primarily by the content of those experiences (“what it is 
like” to have an aesthetic experience), while epistemic accounts consider aesthetic 
experiences as involving a specific mode of knowledge, which can be “direct or non-
inferential knowledge” (Iseminger 2009). As an example, the former is invoked when we 
wonder what the experience of listening to Symphony No. 41 is like, while the latter is when 
we claim that listening, rather than watching, is the primary mode of experiencing the work’s 
qualities. Neo-Lewisian notion is phenomenological, since it appeals to value-valences that 
appear in the content of experiences when defining aesthetic experiences, and attempts to 
characterize a distinctive phenomenological feature that aesthetic experience have. In 
contrast, Iseminger’s account is an epistemic one, based on his view that “appreciation is 
finding the experiencing of a state of affairs to be valuable in itself” (Iseminger 2004, 36), 
and “experiencing is a state of affairs is a matter of having direct (non-inferential but not 
necessarily infallible) knowledge that the state of obtains” (Iseminger 2004, 36).  
 
The second difference is that neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is an objective one, 
while Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is a subjective one. As discussed before, value-
valences are qualities that appear objective in aesthetic experience. Therefore, Lewis’ 
proposal is clearly an objective one. In contrast, Iseminger explained aesthetic experiences in 
terms of “aesthetic state of mind”, and considered it misleading to say that “the aesthetic 
experience is to be identified as ‘an experience essentially valued for its own sake’” 
(Iseminger 2005, 103), since “there is no such thing as a distinctively aesthetic experience” 
(Iseminger 2005, 103). Objectively, aesthetic experiences are same as other sorts of 
experience. The term “aesthetic” refers to a distinctive state of mind of appreciators, rather 
than a distinctive sort of experience: “the aesthetic state of mind - appreciation - is to be 
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identified as essentially valuing an experience for its own sake” (Iseminger 2005, 103). 
Therefore, Iseminger’s account of aesthetic appreciation is subjective ‘in that it is in the form 
of some person subjectively valuing or finding value in an experience, rather than the 
experience’s objectively having value or being valuable that that concept figures in the 
account” (Iseminger 2005, 101-102). 
 
3.1. Replacing the Notion of Appreciation with Neo-Lewisian Notion of Value-
Apprehension 
Having presented the differences between neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension and 
Iseminger’s notion of value-apprehension of aesthetic experience, the following discussion 
aims to analyze 1) whether Neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension could fit well with 
Iseminger’s new aestheticism, and 2) the advantages and disadvantages of this replacement.  
 
Surprisingly, neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension fits well with Iseminger’s new 
aestheticism. An important point is that neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is as 
inclusive as Iseminger’s notion of appreciation, making it able to account for most, if not all, 
instances that Iseminger considered as cases of aesthetic communication. Recall the neo-
Lewisian value-apprehension states that: an experience is aesthetic in case (1) it has intrinsic 
value-valence; (2) “its intrinsic or final value is preponderant in relation to whatever 
instrumental value it may also have; and, (3) it is an absorbed and active contemplation of 
the object” (Livingston 2004, 391-392), which Livingston commented “its conception of 
aesthetic experience is extremely broad, but not all-inconclusive” (Livingston 2004, 391). 
Similarly, Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is also a broad one: “appreciation is finding the 
experiencing of a state of affairs to be valuable in itself” (Iseminger 2004, 36). Along with 
the thought that valuing is a matter of subjective valuing, one can actually appreciate various 
things according to Iseminger’s proposal. As a result, Iseminger’s notion of aesthetic 
communication is also a broad and inclusive one, as evidenced from some instances that 
Ismeinger considered as paradigms or possible paradigms of aesthetic communication: “Dari 
Stolozoff making a collage, calling it Bad Medicine 2002, and displaying it on the Internet 
and at the Agora Ballery in Manhattan…Don King promoting a prize fight…Sylvia Plath 
writing a love letter to Ted Hughes…Ted Cohen writing and reading a philosophical 
paper…” (Iseminger 2004, 59). Some of these instances are considered not merely as 
paradigms of aesthetic communication, but also paradigms of artistic communication; while 
others are considered merely as paradigms of aesthetic communication, or even not. This 
broadness is necessary, because the notion of appreciation is supposed to account for the 
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concept of aesthetic, which covers but is broader than the concept of art. Thus, any attempt 
on replacing or modifying the notion of appreciation needs to include this broadness.  
 
The neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is broad enough to account for those 
instances of aesthetic communication on Iseminger’s list, as it is able to sustain Iseminger 
notion of aesthetic communication, which is the primary notion in Iseminger’s functional 
thesis. For example, it is possible for someone to have aesthetic experience when watching a 
fight according to neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension. Yet, neo-Lewisian notion of 
value-apprehension is not over-inclusive, as it excludes certain experiences that are not 
aesthetic. For instance, a person quickly searches through a newspaper for some financial 
news. More importantly,  
neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is independent from and prior to the concept of 
art. In this sense, replacing Iseminger’s proposal with neo-Lewisian notion is seemingly 
viable. 
 
The neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is also able to uphold our aesthetic intuitions 
that directly experiencing a work of art is necessary in aesthetic appreciation, and that 
artistically relevant properties are distinct from artistically irrelevant properties, because neo-
Lewisian notion of value-apprehension insists that value-apprehension must be a direct, non-
inferential experiencing, and artistically relevant properties are those that are able to be 
experienced. 
 
Finally, the neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is also able to withstand several 
objections, one of which is the antiformalist objection. Although neo-Lewisian notion of 
value-apprehension takes on a phenomenological concept of experience, Livingston believed 
that experiencing is not merely a sensory matter, but a mixture of many other factors, such as 
the agent’s mood and prior experience (Livingston 2006), which may require our conceptual 
capacities. For instance, when reading a poetry written in English, one needs to have a 
concept of those English words. Similar observation was made by Kant, who mentioned that 
cognitive faculties other than sensation and perception are involved in having aesthetic 
experiences. For example, imagination and memory are required when watching a ballet, so 
that one may recall the previous movement and imagine the next move of dancers, resulting 
in a unified or intense feeling. Therefore, neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension can 




The neo-Lewisian notion can also pass the anti-psychological objection. Recall Dickie’s 
view on appreciation: “All this is meant by ‘appreciation’ in the definition is something like 
‘in experiencing the qualities of a thing one finds them worthy or valuable’” (Dickie 1974, 
40-41). It is not clear whether the phrase “finds them worthy or valuable” is referring to an 
objective or subjective sense of valuing, though it is possible that an experience is valuable 
in itself and someone finds its value. In this sense, the phrase would be referring to an 
objective sense of valuing, which is similar to the notion of value-apprehension in neo-
Lewisian proposal. More importantly, Livingston did not appeal to the notion of any 
mysterious state of mind in explaining the concept of aesthetic. Although Livingston referred 
to the notion of contemplation in constructing his neo-Lewisian notion of value-
apprehension, this notion of contemplation is not mysterious. The requirement for having a 
state of contemplation is to at least have “some degree of engagement with, and attention to 
the presented objects or events” (Livingston 2004), and I believe this sort of mental state 
happens not exclusively in aesthetic appreciation. Thus, Livingston’s neo-Lewisian notion of 
value-apprehension is able to withstand the anti-psychological objection. 
 
3.2. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Replacement 
The previous section has shown that the proposed replacement of Iseminger’s notion of 
aesthetic appreciation with neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is feasible. In the 
following, the advantages and the disadvantages of doing so will be discussed. I will argue 
that my replacement is able to 1) solve the problem of negative aesthetic experience that are 
afforded intentionally, and 2) solve the problem of relativism. 
 
First, neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension is able to account for practices that are 
intended to afford negative aesthetic experiences, while Iseminger’s notion of aesthetic 
appreciation is not able to do so. Livingston believed that there are not merely positive, 
intrinsic valences, but also negative, intrinsic valence. Therefore, it does not matter whether 
an aesthetically negative experience is afforded intentionally, as long as the experience has 
negative, intrinsic valence. The replacement would enable Iseminger’s new aestheticism to 
account for practices such as ugly art.  
 
Second, this replacement helps to complete neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension. 
Recall the discussion of Lewis’ condition (5) in his narrow notion of value-apprehension, 
which was rejected by Livingston (Livingston 2004). Livingston considered it 
epistemologically difficult, if not impossible, for us to determine which sort of experiences is 
direct to a work’s reliable and distinct character. For instance, if two persons have two 
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different experiences after appreciating a work of art, how can we identify the one that is 
direct to the reliable and distinct character of the work? Lewis’ own solution seems to imply 
the thought of subjective relativism (Stolnitz 1960; Brown 1950; Garvin 1949), but I propose 
solving it by referring to Iseminger’s notion of aesthetic communication. Works of art are 
intentionally created objects that aim to afford aesthetic experiences to intended audience. 
Therefore, some properties of works of art are intentionally designed and made to complete 
this communication aim, and are supposed to be understood by certain person or certain 
group of persons. For instance, if I say “how are you” with an aim to communicate, my 
intended audience would be at least someone who understands English. Thus, we may say 
that experiences of those intended audience are experiences that direct to objects’ reliable 
and distinct characters under normal condition (such as normal light condition), since those 
characters did not appear accidentally but are created intentionally, and those characters 
contribute to the main function (communication) of the object.  
 
This line of thought may remind us of a famous sort of theories known as ideal observer 
theories21. I have no intention of invoking this line of thought, because the notion of ideal 
observer is problematic (Kieran 2008). For instance, characters that are required for 
appreciating different types of works of art are likely to be mutually exclusive: “My present 
aesthetic character may be just as consistent with idealized romantic, classical, surreal, or 
transgressive art appreciator types. Yet the pronouncements of the classical art appreciator 
type may be inconsistent with those of the surreal art appreciator type” (Kieran 2008, 285). 
Moreover, my proposal does not invoke the thought of intentionalism, which claims that one 
needs to refer to an artist’s creational intentions in order to appreciate works of art correctly. 
My proposal is merely that we have to refer to an artist’s intentions in order to identify the 
intended audience. Whether those intended audience need to refer to an artist’s creational 
intentions in order to have a correct experience of works is another question. 
 
One disadvantage of the proposed replacement is that it is comparatively more complex than 
Iseminger’s original proposal. Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is theoretically simple and 
understandable, as he did not assume any further existence, but only those that are widely 
accepted. The experiential part of his notion refers to any direct experience that we have in 
everyday life, and the valuational part refers to a certain sort of our mental beliefs. In 
                                               
21 Proponents of ideal observer theories appeal to an ideal person who possesses all 
characters or conditions required for appreciating works of art. Thus, experiences of the ideal 
person are always correct and should be followed. According to some theories of ideal 
observer, this ideal person does not need to actually exist. 
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contrast, neo-Lewisian account assumes a sort of additional existence, namely, value-
valence. Lewis explained that value-valences are qualities that appear in aesthetic 
experiences, which are similar to yet somehow different from other sorts of qualities. 
Therefore, it seems that Iseminger’s account is theoretically simpler than Lewis’ account. 
Moreover, the two parts of Iseminger’s account are both comprehensible. Part i) refers to any 
direct experience that we have in our daily life, and part ii) refers to certain sort of our 
mental belief. Both of them are used in our daily communications. In contrast, neo-Lewisian 
notion of value-valence is complicated and technical, requires further explanation, and is 
unusual in our daily communications. Therefore, Iseminger’s notion of appreciation is easier 
to understand than neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension. As such, the proposed 
replacement would make Iseminger’s new aestheticism more complex. However, this would 





Chapter 3 - Introduction 
The third chapter discusses some of the objections raised against the neo-Lewisian notion of 
value-apprehension, especially those by Noel Carroll (Carroll 1999; 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 
2002b; 2005; 2006; 2008; 2012).22 Possible objections against the new aestheticism, namely, 
the anti-experiential claim, will also be examined. 
 
1. Objections against Axiological Approach 
Carroll raised four arguments challenging the axiological approach used by the neo-Lewisian 
notion of value-apprehension in defining aesthetic experience, namely, 1) objection of 
inadequacy, 2) objection of emptiness, 3) objection of evolutionary point of view, and 4) 
objection of type-identical experience.  
 
1.1. Objection of Inadequacy 
This objection challenges the axiological approach for not being an adequate account of 
aesthetic experience. Carroll argued that being intrinsically valuable or being valuable in 
itself is neither sufficient nor necessary condition for being an aesthetic experience. 
 
1.1.1. Objection of Insufficient 
In arguing that the axiological approach is insufficient, Carroll claimed that something other 
than aesthetic experience, such as other sorts of purportedly activities like playing chess, is 
also intrinsically valuable (Carroll 2005). A noteworthy point here is that Carroll himself did 
not commit to claim that aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable in making this 
objection23. He only claimed that if someone believes in the notion of intrinsic value, the 
person is likely to countenance various sorts of activity as intrinsically valuable. Therefore, 
axiologists are at most telling us the necessary condition, but not the sufficient condition. A 
similar point also expressed in Livingston’s discussion of aesthetic experience (Livingston 
2005a). It is possible that some creatures can be intrinsically valuable merely because of the 
very fact of their existence, for example, if they help to maintain be the ecosystem. 
Therefore, aesthetic experience is merely a sub-class of intrinsically valuable things. Things 
                                               
22 Carroll did not refer explicitly to Lewis’ notion of value-apprehension in all those papers, 
except for the one that he was partly replying to Livingston (Carroll 2006). However, Carroll 
did persistently argue against the axiological approach, which is the idea that aesthetic 
experiences are to be defined with a special sort of value known as the intrinsic value. Thus, 
I made a lot of reference to his papers, since Lewis’ notion of value-apprehension is an 
axiological account. 
23 Carroll argued that aesthetic experience is more likely to be merely instrumentally 
valuable, instead of intrinsically valuable, from the evolutionary point of view. This point is 
shown in later discussions. 
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other than aesthetic experience, for instance, other experiences such as playing chess or 
existences of some creatures, are also intrinsically valuable. As such, merely claiming that 
aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable is not sufficient for helping us to distinguish 
aesthetic experience from those other sorts of thing.  
 
Carroll’s objection is plausible because it is clear that things other than aesthetic experience 
can be intrinsically valuable. For example, one may think that an experience of spending 
time with his/her friends is intrinsically valuable, even though this experience is not an 
instance of aesthetic experience. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that Carroll 
successfully argued against the axiologists who merely claimed that aesthetic experience is 
intrinsically valuable. However, neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension appeals not 
merely to the notion of intrinsic value, but also the notion of inherent value. An inherently 
valuable thing is capable of affording intrinsically valuable experience to someone who 
contemplates on it. It follows that an aesthetic experience can be specified as experience that 
is generated by contemplating on an inherently valuable thing. An ecologist may attribute 
intrinsic value to creatures because of their very existence. Yet, those creatures do not have 
inherent value, because the above attribution is not to anyone’s direct experiencing of them. 
Aesthetic experience is not merely intrinsically valuable. Rather, “what is required here is 
that the intrinsic value of the experience arises in and through the contemplation of the 
item’s features or qualities” (Livingston 2005a, 41). This additional requirement helps to 
distinguish aesthetic experience from other sorts of thing that are also intrinsically valuable. 
As such, neo-Lewisian proposal is free from Carroll’s objection of insufficient.  
 
1.1.2. Objection of Unnecessary 
In arguing that the axiological approach is unnecessary, Carroll claimed that some 
experiences of works of art are not intrinsically valuable, and therefore, the axiological 
approach is unnecessary, because it cannot account for our experiences of those works of art. 
Carroll made use of actual counterexamples in claiming that some works of art actually 
afford some 1) disvaluable experiences, or 2) indifferent experiences. Carroll seemed to 
assume here that a definition of aesthetic experience has to account for our experiences of 
works of art24. This is because the realm of the aesthetic and the realm of art is considered to 
                                               
24 A noteworthy point is that Carroll did not attempt to claim that an axiological definition 
has to account for all sorts of experience afforded by a work of art. Carroll noted that works 
of art are able to afford experiences other than aesthetic one (Carroll 2001a). For example, 
religious works of art and political works of art are able to afford religious experiences and 
political experiences. He held the distinction between aesthetic experience and the other 
 
61 
be closely connected (Carroll 1999, Iseminger 2009), and many proponents of the 
axiological approach attempt to define works of art with the essential function of affording 
aesthetic experience (Anderson 2000, Iseminger 2004, Livingston 2005a).  
 
According to Carroll, a possible example of disvaluable work of art is a tribal mask (Carroll 
2005). The function of a tribal mask is to provoke experiences of terror in the enemy. 
Nevertheless, a tribal mask is still considered to be an instance of prehistoric arts. Therefore, 
Carroll concluded that a tribal mask is a counterexample showing that being intrinsically 
valuable is not a necessary condition of being an aesthetic experience. Carroll further 
reminded us that a tribal mask is intended by its maker to provoke experience of terror in the 
enemy. Therefore, it is useless for the proponents of the axiological approach to appeal to the 
notion of intention in explaining the experience of terror afforded by a tribal mask (Carroll 
2005). In making the above argument, Carroll made several assumptions. First, Carroll 
regarded those experiences of terror as not intrinsically valuable, since they are considered to 
be negative, rather than positive. Second, Carroll considered that those experiences of terror 
afforded by tribal masks are aesthetic experiences.  
 
Several responses are available. First, one may simply reject the close connection between 
the notion of aesthetic and the notion of art, and claim that some works of art are not 
intended to afford aesthetic experience. The cost of this response is a loss of theoretical 
advantage of the aesthetic approach, namely, the ability to provide a unified explanation of 
the identity of art and the value of art (Carroll 1999). Second, one may reject objects that are 
intended to afford negative experience as works of art. The cost of this response would be 
the exclusion of a large amount of objects, for example, most avant-garde works, as works of 
art. But some philosophers question that this is not an appropriate response, because many 
avant-garde works are influential in the contemporary development of art (Carroll 1999). 
However, neo-Lewisian proposal is free from this objection, since Livingston took into 
account both positive and negative intrinsic value-valence as aesthetically relevant.  
 
The other counterexample is indifferent aesthetic experiences. Carroll mentioned cases in 
which one may “apprehend with understanding the formal, aesthetic, and/or expressive 
properties of an artwork, but neither values or disvalues them, intrinsically or otherwise” 
(Carroll 2006, 92), and argued that it is possible that one attends to all properties of a work 
                                               
sorts of experience, such as religious experience and political experience, and explicitly 
rejected any attempt on expanding the notion of aesthetic to encompass those experiences 
(Carroll 2012).   
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of art with understanding and discrimination, and notices that the work is “competent 
enough”, without being moved to praise or condemn it. He proposed that someone who 
appreciates contemporary art on a regular basis may have this kind of indifferent experience, 
and used an imaginary situation to support his objection: “[one may] consider the situation in 
which one accurately notices the way in which the enjambment of a line of poetry puts a 
special fermata on a key word in a poem. The effect is okay, but you’ve seen something like 
it many times before, and it is nothing to write home about. But neither is the strategy inept 
or inapposite. You do not rate your experience as valuable, intrinsically or instrumentally, 
but you do not disvalue it either” (Carroll 2006, 92)25. Carroll argued that such an experience 
is aesthetic because it is object-directed and involves attending to the form of the poem.  
 
There are several responses to Carroll’s objection. First, one may question that there is no 
such thing as indifferent aesthetic experience. It is not clear that the person’s experience is 
truly indifferent in Carroll’s imaginary poem situation, as the word “okay” might count as a 
kind of value-relative response. Livingston also made a similar comment in his paper, 
claiming that saying a work is “competent enough” may count as a value-relative response 
(Livingston 2006). He further pointed out that Lewis would reject Carroll’s objection, 
because Lewis believed that experiences always have an immediate, intrinsic valence. 
 
Second, one may question that it is inappropriate to consider indifferent aesthetic 
experiences, if such experiences do exist, as instances of aesthetic experience. This response 
refers to a classificational consideration. Livingston suggested that “there are different 
possible ways of marking off different sorts of experience, and some of them reflect and 
serve certain interests better than others” (Livingston 2006, 276), and explained this with the 
classification of experiences occurring in sexual intercourse. Imagine that there are two 
persons, A and B, who enter into sexual intercourse. Person A enters into sexual intercourse 
for merely instrumental purpose, such as reproduction, and finds the experience is 
indifferent, while Person B enters into sexual intercourse not merely for instrumental 
purpose, but also for intrinsic purpose, such as sexual enjoyment, and finds the experience is 
valuable. If our interest is to know whether a person “might have contracted a sexually 
transmitted disease” (Livingston 2006, 276), the distinction between indifferent experience 
and valuable experience would not matter, and we do not classify experiences according to 
this distinction. However, if our interest is to know whether a person is having “certain kinds 
of experience that are or are not conducive to her flourishing or well-being” (Livingston 
                                               
25 Carroll constructed a similar imaginary situation in his recent paper, but he chose to 
compose a “perfectly respectable, if uninspired, painter” instead (Carroll 2012, 167). 
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2006, 276), the distinction between indifferent experience and valuable experience would 
matter, because valuable experiences are conducive to a person’s flourishing or well-being, 
and we may classify experiences according to this distinction. Similarly, if works of art do 
afford intrinsic valenced experiences (neither positive or negative) and valence-free 
experiences, one may claim that only the former kind of experiences are aesthetic 
experience, because they are conducive to a person’s flourishing or well-being. One may 
reject this classification of aesthetic experience and consider it as building an honorific status 
into the concept of aesthetic experience, because “we here deal with one of the universal and 
vital interests of mankind……it is still of first importance that we adhere—if by good 
fortune we may—to what is dictated by the nature and direction of these common human 
interests” (Lewis 1946, 435). 
 
Besides Livingston’s response, it is also possible to question Carroll’s assumption of 
classifying indifferent experiences as instances of aesthetic experience. Carroll seemed to 
assume that an account of aesthetic experience has to include any experience “attending with 
understanding to formal, and/or otherwise aesthetic and/or expressive properties of an 
artwork are examples of aesthetic experience” (Carroll 2012). This is probable because of 
the ambition that an account of aesthetic experience should be able to defend “the close 
connection between the realm of the aesthetic thereby explained and the realm of art: 
(Iseminger 2009, 100). A theoretical cost of ignoring the indifferent experience is to lose the 
connection between the realm of the aesthetic and the realm of art, and the advantage of the 
aesthetic approach in explaining. It is possible, though, to exclude the indifferent experience 
without paying for the theoretical cost, such as through the notion of intention. We may 
claim that works of art are merely intended by artists to afford aesthetic experience. 
Therefore, it is possible that some artists fail to realize their intention. Is it possible for 
Carroll to reject this response, just as he did in his objection of negative aesthetic 
experience? Can Carroll claim that those works of art are intended to afford indifferent 
experience? It is a possible option for Carroll, as long as he could provide an actual example 
to support it, since it is a factual claim. Yet, it is doubtful that Carroll can provide such an 
example. In making the objection of negative aesthetic experiences, Carroll appealed not 
only to the audience’s actual experiences, but also explicitly mentioned the artists’ 
intentions. However, in making the objection of indifferent experiences, Carroll appealed 
solely to the audience’s actual experiences without referring to artists’ intentions. This is 
probably because Carroll realized that there is no plausible actual example of such intention. 
It is arguable that any work of art is intended by the artist to afford either positive or negative 
aesthetic experience. Then how should we classify one’s indifferent experience of attending 
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to formal, and/or otherwise aesthetic and/or expressive properties of a work of art? There are 
two possible situations. First, the artist’s intention is successfully realized. Second, the artist 
fails to realize her intention. In the first situation, if a person attends to formal, and/or 
otherwise aesthetic and/or expressive properties of the work and results in having indifferent 
experience, it seems plausible to conclude that the person does not fully understand the 
work, and it is doubtful to say that her experience is an aesthetic one. In the second situation, 
if a person attends to formal, and/or otherwise aesthetic and/or expressive properties of the 
work and results in having indifferent experience, we may conclude that the person does 
fully understand the work. However, the experience is not an aesthetic one, because the 
failure of artist in realizing her intention.  
 
Even if there is actually an example of a work of art that is intended by its artist to afford 
indifferent experience, it still would not cause serious problem to Iseminger’s and 
Livingston’s proposals, because such an example only shows that the close connection 
between the notion of aesthetic and the notion of work of art does not hold. However, both 
Livingston and Iseminger did not propose such a connection. Livingston noticed that works 
of art may afford different sorts of experience, and he only focused on one specific sort of 
experience, namely, that which involves value apprehension. Moreover, Livingston did not 
mention that there must be a close connection between the notion of aesthetic and the notion 
of work of art. As for Iseminger, instead of accepting the traditional functional thesis, which 
emphasizes the close connection between the notion of aesthetic and the notion of work of 
art, he revised it in his book The Aesthetic Function of Art to become a close connection 
between the notion of aesthetic and the notion of the artworld and practice of art, because he 
noticed that there are some works of art that do not afford or are not intended to provide 
aesthetic experience (Iseminger 2004). Therefore, even if Carroll did put forward such an 
example, it would not threaten Iseminger’s or Livingston’s proposals.  
 
1.2. Objection of Emptiness 
This objection challenges the emptiness of the axiological approach, in which Carroll 
claimed that the axiological approach is theoretically and practically non-informative.  
 
1.2.1. Objection of Theoretical Emptiness  
Carroll first proposed this objection in his paper ‘Aesthetic Experience Revisited’ (Carroll 
2002b), leading to several exchanges between Livingston and himself (Carroll 2002b, 2006; 
Livingston 2004, 2006). Carroll contended that evolutionary explanations give us the best 
framework for understanding our actions of seeking for aesthetic experience. He believed 
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that aesthetic experiences are instrumentally valuable in the evolutionary point of value, and 
claimed that aesthetic experiences that are afforded by works of art are able to “nurture a 
sense of group cohesion”, because those experiences are generally shared amongst a group 
of audience. He further proposed that the evolutionary explanations and the claim that 
aesthetic experiences are instrumentally valuable give are the best frameworks for 
understanding human nature. On the other hand, he rejected the hypothesis that aesthetic 
experiences are both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable, because the hypothesis that 
aesthetic experiences are intrinsically valuable “leaves us literally speechless”, and “provides 
little guidance about what the pertinent features of aesthetic experience are” (Carroll 2002b, 
159). Therefore, he concluded that the hypothesis that aesthetic experiences are intrinsically 
valuable appears to be an “explanatory dead end”.  
 
In response, Livingston argued that the axiological approach can be useful in explaining 
human’s status of action and practical reasoning. For example, some erotic behaviors can be 
“explained at least a modest sort of way by noting that persons intrinsically value the 
pleasure this behavior yields or is expected to yield” (Livingston 2004, 386). Therefore, 
referring to some person’s “proximal interest in an intrinsically valued end could indeed be 
explanatory” (Livingston 2004, 386), and a proximal explanation can be compatible with an 
evolutionary account. Our evolutionary interests may not always conform to our short-term 
personal interests. For instance, having children concerns evolutionary interest. On the flip 
side, it may not conform to our short-term personal interests, such as having lots of 
disposable income for holidays. A possible explanation for those situations is that nature 
makes what is in our evolutionary interest intrinsically rewarding. For instance, having 
children is a possible consequence of having sex, and having sex is intrinsically rewarding. 
According to this explanation, we achieve evolutionary interest by performing actions that 
are intrinsically rewarding at the personal level.26  
 
Moreover, the hypothesis that aesthetic experiences are intrinsically valuable has 
explanatory power, though even if there is a successful model of explanation which shows 
that attribution of intrinsic valuation is non-explanatory, it does not immediately “entail 
worthwhile classification in aesthetic need to satisfy the goals of scientific or other 
explanation” (Livingston 2004, 386), meaning that further debate is required in order to 
show that classification in aesthetic should conform to classification in science. Some 
classifications in aesthetic are capable of serving certain cognitive ends. For example, they 
                                               




can help to identify items corresponding to certain desires and interests. Carroll argued that 
Livingston has missed the core of his objection, namely, he did not deny the claim that the 
notion of intrinsically value can help to explain the proximate cause of a person’s behavior. 
Rather, the “explanatory-dead-end” objection argues that appealing to the notion of intrinsic 
value had no explicatory value in accounting for the appearance of aesthetic experience from 
the objective point of view.  
 
Finally, Carroll’s objection only challenges the objective axiological approach, but not the 
subjective axiological approach. He claimed that aesthetic experiences are not objectively 
intrinsically valuable. Nevertheless, a person can still subjectively believe that aesthetic 
experiences are intrinsically valuable (Carroll 2006). In response, Livingston rejected 
Carroll’s distinction between the subjective and the objective axiology approach, and pointed 
out that “the belief, qua physically instantiated psychological state or event, would still be 
part of the objective order and so could have explanatory relevance” (Livingston 2006, 279). 
 
1.2.2. Objection of Practical Emptiness 
Carroll commented that the axiological approach does not merely lack explanatory value 
from a theoretical point of view, it also lacks guiding value from a practical point of view. 
He claimed that “the aforesaid conditions [conditions that aesthetic experience are 
contemplative and sympathetic attention to an object for its own sake]… provide virtually no 
guidance either concerning how I might go about having an aesthetic experience, or how I 
might instruct someone else to do so, or, if I am engaged in research, what behaviors or 
mental processes I should observe in order to investigate aesthetic experience” (Carroll 
2008, 158). Carroll appealed to two cases in explaining that the axiology approach is 
practically useless. First, Carroll considered the case of collaboration between philosophy of 
art and other academic fields, such as science. Carroll agreed that there is a trend in 
philosophy of art to collaborate with cognitive science in order to enrich philosophical 
inquires, but the axiological approach is “effectively useless from the point of view of 
empirical research” (Carroll 2008, 158). Second, Carroll considered the case of teaching new 
art appreciators, and concluded that it is hard “to imagine how anyone could use this meager 
description concretely to initiate having an aesthetic experience of an artwork” (Carroll 
2008, 158). If we tell a beginner to appreciate the work for its own sake, the person would 
not know what to do, because the clause “valued for its own sake” is “primarily negative”. 
The clause “tells one what you shouldn’t be doing – namely, valuing the experience 
instrumentally - and not how to go about what you should be doing” (Carroll 2008, 158). 
Therefore, the axiological approach is practically empty. In contrast, Carroll claimed that his 
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content-oriented approach is much more informative, since it tells us what to look for if we 
want to have aesthetic experience. 
 
There are several responses to this objection. First, one may point out that practical 
usefulness is not a decisive factor in deciding whether to accept or to reject a theoretical 
approach. This does not imply collaboration between philosophy of art and other academic 
fields may benefit future academic development, but we should be aware that different 
academic fields may study and explain a phenomenon with different approach. A biologist 
and a psychologist may both study and explain an abnormal behavior of a person, but a 
biologist may investigate the physical state of the person and explain her behavior in terms 
of genetic defect, while a psychologist may investigate the  mental state of the person and 
explain her behavior in terms of her upbringing. There is no doubt that the collaboration 
between the two academic fields can provide a more complete explanation of the abnormal 
behavior, in addition to enriching future inquiry in both fields. However, this does not mean 
that psychologists should modify psychological theories and terminology merely for 
promoting the collaboration. Similarly, the perspective of philosophy of art is different from 
the perspective of other academic fields. As Livingston pointed out, philosophers may care 
more about human’s flourishing or well-being (Livingston 2006). Therefore, the objection 
that the axiological approach provides little information for empirical research may not to be 
a decisive objection. In considering the second case, one can point out that the lack of 
guiding does not necessarily have to be a decisive factor in rejecting a theory. Instead, the 
primary target of a theoretical approach is to explain certain phenomena adequately. As long 
as the axiological approach is able to account for the concept of aesthetic experience 
properly, we may still consider it as an acceptable approach.  
 
Second, it is debatable whether the axiological approach is as useless as Carroll had thought. 
Lewis mentioned that the appearance of valued valence usually accompanies the feeling of 
enjoyment or attractive (although they are not identical and they are not logically 
conditioned on each other). In conducting an empirical research, a cognitive scientist may 
look for the feeling of enjoyment when identifying an aesthetic experience. In some cases, 
we may also guide people with negative claim. For instance, if a person is going to perform 
in front of the public and feels very nervous, one may tell the person to focus on her 
performance and not to think about other possible consequences that the performance may 
bring, such as negative responses from audience. It is fair to say that the above suggestion 
has some guiding power in terms of telling the performer what to do. Similarly, in teaching a 
new art appreciator, we may tell her to focus on and enjoy the art of work itself, and not to 
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think about other possible consequences, such as certain economy benefits. It seems also fair 
to say that the axiological approach provides certain degree of guiding for the beginner.  
 
Third, although the axiological approach is “primarily negative”, it is compatible with other 
positive clauses. Carroll noticed that point, and determined that “the friend of the standard 
characterization of aesthetic experience may suggest that his approach and the content 
oriented approach are not really at odds. They can be amalgamated this: an aesthetic 
experience involves (1) informed attention to the aesthetic properties of an artwork (2) which 
attention is valued for its own sake” (Carroll 2008, 159). Neo-Lewisian axiological account 
of aesthetic experience is perfectly compatible with Carroll’s content-oriented account. 
However, Carroll immediately rejected the proposal, because he considered the clause 
“valued for its own sake” unnecessary. Carroll seemed to realize that the axiological 
approach can become more informative by combining with other positive clauses. An 
axiologist may also able to tell a cognitive scientist or a new art appreciator to attend to 
formal, aesthetic, or expressive properties to help them have aesthetic experience. Thus, he 
returned to the objection of unnecessary and claimed that even if clause (1) and clause (2) 
are compatible, clause (2) should not be accepted. It is quite clear that Carroll shifted his 
objection from emptiness to unnecessary. However, as discussed in the previous section, 
Carroll’s objection of unnecessary seems to be problematic in that it does not support his 
objection of emptiness, since there is no logical implication between the two objections. 
 
1.3. Objection of Evolutionary Point of View 
Instead of appealing merely to philosophical analysis, Carroll also appealed to scientific 
theory in explaining aesthetic experience. Carroll continuously argued that aesthetic 
experience should be explained under the framework of evolutionary psychology (Carroll 
2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002b, 2005, 2006). The main assumption of evolutionary psychology 
is that “all animal species have evolved to increase fitness for survival and reproduction” 
(Dutton 2009, 696), and evolutionary psychologists “extend the findings Darwinian theory to 
the working of the human psyche” (Dutton 2009, 696) to attempt to explain our cross-
cultural, universal interests of art in terms of our inheritance as an evolved species. Our 
mental aspects, such as our mental capacities, inclinations, and desires, are influenced by and 
can be explained by evolution. In short, evolution is a process of adapting our physical or 
mental aspect over millions of years with the aim of increasing our chance of reproduction in 
the environment. Our evolution is based on many mechanisms, for instance mutation. 
However, Dutton only discussed natural selection and sexual selection in his paper (Dutton 
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2009). Therefore, my summary only focuses on those two mechanisms.27 In natural 
selection, the wider environment decides what factor will be conducive to individual’s 
reproductive success. For example, individuals with flexible hand are better at making tools, 
which help those individuals to increase their chances of survival, and in turn, their chances 
of reproduction. In sexual selection, individual’s choice of their partners determines the rate 
of reproductive success. For example, peacocks with the grandest tail tend to have a higher 
chance of reproduction, because this indicates that the peacock is strong enough to grow and 
to drag the heavy tails around. Therefore, peahens may choose the peacock with the grandest 
tail. Individuals who are advantageous in natural and sexual selection are “more likely to 
have descendants and to pass those traits on to them” (Dutton 2009, 697), and this explains 
our cross-cultural, universal interests. 
 
Carroll laid out his objections mainly in two papers (Carroll 2000, 2002b, 2002b). In “Art 
and the Domain of the Aesthetic”, Carroll rejected the hypothesis that aesthetic experiences 
are just valued for their own sake and considered it an inadequate hypothesis for explaining 
“why humans have aesthetic experience at this point in our evolution” (Carroll 2000, 197). 
Rather, he claimed that aesthetic experiences are valued for the sake of evolutionary 
advantages. He believed that our capacity of having aesthetic experiences is based on certain 
powers that benefit us in evolution, and having aesthetic experiences help to refine those 
powers. He further identified and discussed three kinds of experiences known as the major 
modes of aesthetic experience: 1) experience of artist form, 2) experience of expressive 
properties, and 3) experience of aesthetic properties.28 First, he suggested that our capacity of 
experiencing artist form is “part and parcel of our powers of pattern detection” (Carroll 
2000, 198). The power of pattern detection allows us to control the environment and benefits 
us in natural selection,29 and our experience of artist form helps to keep the powers of pattern 
detection alive and to refine it. Moreover, since artist forms are products of intentional 
activities, experiencing them may also help us to comprehend purposes and intentions. 
Second, Carroll proposed that experiences of expressive properties “also emerge from and 
                                               
27 Thanks to Stephen Davies for clarifying the distinction between natural and sexual 
selection in his comments after my thesis examination. 
28 Carroll also discussed a more controversial mode of aesthetic experiences known as 
interpretative experiences. He argued that even interpretative experiences have adaptive 
value and are therefore instrumentally valuable. However, Carroll did not mention the 
interpretative experiences in his later papers or in his content-oriented account of aesthetic 
experience. Therefore, it is not included in this thesis. 
29 Carroll did not explain how the powers of pattern detection allow us to control the 
environment. It is possible that he considered the investigations of natural science as a type 
of pattern detection. 
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contributes to our ability to recognize what is going on with our conspecifics insofar as the 
detection of such properties is related to our capability to recognize the emotive states and 
expressive behavior of other humans” (Carroll 2000, 198). This recognitional capacity helps 
us to gather information for various social purposes, which may probably benefit us in 
natural and sexual selection.30 Third, Carroll mentioned that our experience of aesthetic 
properties is derived from the capacity of making fine discrimination between stimuli. 
Similar to the capacity of pattern detection, the capacity of making fine discrimination is of 
great evolutionary advantage, since it may help us to control the environment. Therefore, 
Carroll concluded that all three modes “seem to have adaptive value and are therefore 
valuable instrumentally” (Carroll 2000, 198).  
 
In “Aesthetic Experience Revisited”, Carroll proposed that “aesthetic experience makes the 
transmission of a common culture of feelings accessible” (Carroll 2002b, 157), which helps 
to “nurture a sense of group cohesion”. In summary, Carroll concluded that “aesthetic 
experiences of art engage audiences in the play of their emotive, sensuous, and intellective 
powers, redundantly encoding useful cultural knowledge across several faculties and thereby 
rendering it both more entrenched in memory and easier to access than it might otherwise 
be” (Carroll 2002b, 158). He raised two questions to proponents of the axiology approach: 1) 
Why aesthetic experience has persisted throughout human history, if it is not valuable 
because of its beneficial consequences? (Carroll 2002b), and 2) How can the objective 
intrinsic value of aesthetic experience be made comprehensible in a world where evolution 
reigns? (Carroll 2002b, 157).  
 
The key point for answering Carroll’s first question is to point out that Livingston did not 
deny the claim that aesthetic experience could be valuable because of its beneficial 
consequences. It is possible for axiologists to claim that aesthetic experience is both intrinsic 
valuable and adaptive valuable, therefore aesthetic experience has persisted throughout 
human history, because it provides certain beneficial adaptive consequences in our 
evolution. Recall that Stecker mentioned that not all axiological accounts exclude the notion 
of instrumental value (Stecker 2001). Livingston’s classification considers mainly the 
intrinsic value of aesthetic experience, because this is relevant to human’s well-being, but he 
did not deny that aesthetic experience can also benefit human being in other aspects, for 
                                               
30 A person who is sensitive may be able to avoid certain risky situations, and this may 
increase her chances of survival. For example, she is able to stay away from angry people 
and keeps herself away from conflicts. It is also easier for a person who is sensitive to find a 
partner, and this may increase her chance of reproduction. 
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instance, in our evolution. Thus, Livingston’s version of axiology definition is compatible 
with Carroll’s evolutionary view of aesthetic experience. Besides, things that have persisted 
throughout human history are not necessarily evolutionarily adaptive. For example, 
experience of taking drugs have persisted throughout human history, even though they are 
maladaptive. It is possible that works of art are super-stimulants and they activate our 
pleasure systems just as drugs do.31 Moreover, it seems plausible and intuitive to say that we 
will persistently seek things that are intrinsically valuable to us, since intrinsically valuable 
things are able to motivate us at the personal level.32 For example, we may persistently seek 
pleasurable experiences, and positive aesthetic experiences are usually accompanied by 
enjoyable or pleasurable feelings, even though those feelings are not logical conditions for 
having aesthetic experiences. Although it is unlikely the case that all aesthetic experiences 
are enjoyable or pleasurable, it is plausible to claim that some aesthetic experiences are 
enjoyable or pleasurable. Therefore, aesthetic experience persists throughout human history.  
 
One may further ask how we should account for negative aesthetic experience with this 
explanation, since negative aesthetic experience is not pleasurable and people may not 
persistently seek it. There are three answers to this question. First, it is arguable that some 
negative aesthetic experiences can be enjoyable, even if it is not pleasurable. For instance, 
tragedy affords certain negative experiences, but people may still enjoy having those 
experiences, and may still persistently seek those experiences. Second, some negative 
aesthetic experiences result from failed attempts on generating positive aesthetic 
experiences. An artist may fail to realize her intention of making a work of art that affords 
positive aesthetic experience, and this failed work may result in affording negative, but not 
positive, aesthetic experiences. But those failures would not stop us from pursuing positively 
aesthetic experiences, thus they do not cause any problem to the claim that aesthetic 
experience is persisted throughout human history, because aesthetic experience is 
intrinsically valuable. Third, some may claim that there are works of art that are intended by 
their creators to afford aesthetic experiences. For instance, some avant-garde works are 
intended to afford negative experiences of shock or experiences of disturbance, and those 
negative experiences are unenjoyable and unpleasurable. One thing that needs to point out is 
                                               
31 Thanks to Stephen Davies for providing this response in his comments after my thesis 
examination. 
32 I have no intention to deny that we can seek different explanations from other 
perspectives. For instance, scientists may ask why something is intrinsically valuable to us 
and look for an answer. I merely intend to point out that appealing to the notion of intrinsic 
value is a possible explanation of the persistently existence of aesthetic experience at the 
personal level.   
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that those negative experiences do not seem to persist throughout human history. It seems 
that there are not works of art that are similar to avant-garde works in other cultures’ art 
tradition. Thus, it is not clear that Carroll refers to those intended negative aesthetic 
experiences in when he said that aesthetic experiences has persisted throughout human 
history.  
 
As for Carroll’s second question, one may argue that the objective intrinsic value of aesthetic 
experience needs not be comprehensible in a world where evolution reigns. It remains 
arguable that certain philosophical terms, such as intrinsically valuable, should be in accord 
with the framework of nature science in order for them to have explanatory power. As 
Livingston argued, there are other things philosophers may care about, for instance human’s 
well-being, that are not the first concern of scientists. Further, introduction of the notion of 
intrinsic value helps to complete the evolutionary explanation. Carroll recognized that the 
notion of intrinsic value is compatible with the notion of adaptive value (Carroll 2001b, 
2002b). However, he considered the “intrinsic valuable” clause unnecessary in his 
evolutionary explanation, because the clause has no extra explanatory power in a “world 
where evolution reigns” (Carroll 2002b, 2006). This is not the case, however, because 
introducing the notion of intrinsic value may help to explain how self-motivation gets us to 
do things that are in our evolutionary interests, things that we otherwise have no motivation 
to do despite them being what evolution values most.33 Therefore, I argue that introducing 
the notion of intrinsic value helps to complete our understanding of evolution. 
 
The notion of intrinsic value may also help to explain the origin of pursuing aesthetic 
experience. 
By introducing the relation between natural selection and psychological evolution, Dutton 
mentioned that our pleasure of sex and our pleasure of eating is a Pleistocene adaptation: 
“The pleasure of eating sweet and fatty foods is a Pleistocene adaptation for nutrition and 
survival as much as the pleasure of sex is an adaptation for procreation: ancestors who 
enjoyed eating and sex were in fact more likely to have descendants and to pass those traits 
on to them” (Dutton 2009, 697). Similarly, we may claim that the pleasure of aesthetic 
experiences is an adaptation for intellectual development. Specifically, ancestors who 
enjoyed aesthetic appreciation were in fact more likely to have descendants and to pass those 
traits on to them. This explanation affirms the adaptive value of aesthetic experience. 
Aesthetic experience helps to increase our chances of survival in certain ways, and ancestors 
                                               




who enjoyed aesthetic appreciation were likely to have descendants with similar traits. 
Therefore, history of aesthetic appreciation and art creation are found in various societies, 
because people who do that form the majority of all societies due to their ancestors having a 
higher chance of survival. On the other hand, the explanation also affirms the intrinsic value 
of aesthetic experience. The very reason that makes those ancestors engage in aesthetic 
appreciation is the enjoyable or pleasurable feeling that they have in aesthetic appreciation. It 
is simply because that aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable, and those positive 
valences generate the enjoyable feeling for those ancestors. Therefore, those ancestors and 
their descendants continuously pursue aesthetic experience. In summary, the notion of 
intrinsic value is not merely compatible with the evolutionary framework of aesthetic 
experience, more importantly it also helps to complete the evolutionary framework by 
providing us with the reason for pursuing aesthetic experience. Thus, contrary to Carroll’s 
view, it is a necessary, instead of unnecessary, part within the evolutionary framework of 
aesthetic experience.  
 
Carroll provided another explanation for the hypothesis that aesthetic experience carries 
quotient of pleasure or satisfaction in terms of historical and cultural considerations (Carroll 
2000). Specifically, he commented that “historically, then, it can be argued that through their 
artistic traditions cultures have linked pleasure to pattern detection, the detection of 
expressive properties and the like in order to achieve evolutionarily valuable and, in all 
likelihood, socially valuable goals” (Carroll 2000, 199). Carroll seemed to explain the notion 
of intrinsic value in terms of the notion of adaptive value. However, Carroll’s explanation 
has several problems. First, he did not provide enough details on the “linking process”. 
Second, suppose that Carroll was able to provide plausible support for his explanation, his 
explanation is not able to account for the reason that we pursue aesthetic experience, even 
when we do not realize the adaptive value of aesthetic experience, whereas introducing the 
notion of intrinsic value may explain our action by self-motivation at the personal level. In 
fact, Carroll’s explanation can be combined with my explanation, as follows. The very 
reason that makes those ancestors engage in aesthetic appreciation is the feelings of pleasure 
or satisfaction, and aesthetic experience benefits those ancestors and their descendants 
through the evolutionary process. As they become majority in various societies, they would 
start the tradition of aesthetic appreciation and art creation. Since the historical and cultural 
tradition of aesthetic appreciation and art creation help link the feeling of pleasure or 
satisfaction with aesthetic experience, people who do not have the feeling of pleasure or 
satisfaction initially may gain those feelings later on. Third, suppose that Carroll was able to 
solve the two problems with successful explanation, it is still arguable whether we should 
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not classify aesthetic experience according to the evolutionary framework. As Livingston 
argued, evolutionary theorists may focus on certain benefits in our evolutionary process, but 
this does not mean that philosophers should also do so, since philosophers may focus on 
interests that are different from evolutionary theorists. 
 
1.4. Objection of Type-Identical Experience 
After dealing with Carroll’s objection against the objective version axiological approach, this 
section discusses his view on the subjective axiology approach. The subjective axiological 
approach explains the notion “intrinsic value” in terms of our belief, but not the objective 
value-valence. Carroll suggested that the subjective axiological approach has mistakenly 
classified two type-identical experiences into two different classes, because audience’s belief 
does not matter in the classification. A noteworthy point is that the objection of type-
identical experience does not affect the neo-Lewisian notion of aesthetic experience, which 
is an objective, rather than subjective, one. However, it is still worthy to consider Carroll’s 
objection because of two reasons: 1) Livingston reminded us that the distinction between the 
subjective and objective versions of the axiological approach is not always clear, and 2) 
some proponents of objective axiological approach also hold that audience’ belief does 
matter in aesthetic appreciation, and they tend to believe that an experience is not an 
aesthetic one if a person appreciates a work of art merely for the sake of others (Livingston 
2005a, 2006).  
 
It is useful to briefly review Carroll’s objection, which he developed on George Dickie’s 
view (Dickie 1964). In making the objection, Carroll proposed the following situation: “two 
young people are listening to, say, Symphony No. 41. Both attend carefully to the intricate 
contrapuntal interplay alluded to above. Both are suitably educated musically in such a way 
that their listening is informed. Indeed, let us assume that they share exactly the same 
musicological background. Thus, for every formal articulation that the one young listener 
attends to, so too does the other. The content of their experience and their manner of tracking 
its unfolding are type-identical. Both would appear to be having the same experience of the 
music. However, one of the listeners attends to the symphony because he is going to be 
examined on it in his Music Appreciation 101 class tomorrow, whereas the other listener 
follows the evolution of the music closely with no ulterior motivation” (Carroll 2012, 166). 
Carroll concluded that the two listeners are “undergoing the same experience’ because their 
experiences are both ‘directed at the formal articulation of the work”. As such, it is a mistake 




It is clear that Carroll’s conclusion assumes the correctness of his content-oriented approach, 
which states that experiences are to be classified according to their direct content. Since the 
content is the same, he concluded that the experiences of the two listeners are type-identical. 
However, it is easy to see that Carroll’s conclusion is questionable by considering Stecker’s 
argument, in which Stecker viewed the experiences of the two listeners as only qualitatively 
identical, and their experiences are not the same in every respect (Stecker 2010). Stecker 
concluded that this kind of thought experiment only shows that the two listeners are 
“perceptually processing the same properties” of the work. However, an experience includes 
aspects other than that. Stecker illustrated his point by extending Carroll’s thought 
experiment. Suppose that a psychologist invents a method that is able to provide the very 
same kinds of benefit at a significantly greater degree. For example, the listener can get all 
information that she needs in her examination within a very short period of time and she 
needs not to directly experience Symphony No. 41. Now the two listeners try the method and 
they react differently. One listener thinks that the method is perfectly fine since it helps to 
shorten her study time. But the other listener misses the experience of listening to Symphony 
No. 41. Although the new method is able to benefit him even more, he finds that he prefers 
and enjoys the experience of direct appreciation. Stecker believed that this expansion shows 
that experiences of the listener is not exactly the same. Rather, they are different types of 
experience, because they two listener are “reacting to the perceptual processing differently” 
(Stecker 2010, 58). Carroll’s type-identical conclusion is either wrong or Carroll implicitly 
shifted the meaning of type-identical into merely perceptual-identical.  
 
Carroll was not readily convinced by such response. He insisted that aesthetic experience 
should be defined with the content that they direct, and audience’s motivations and reactions 
do not matter in identifying aesthetic experience (Carroll 1999). He further argued that we 
should appeal to the notion of attention, instead of the notion of value for its own sake, when 
identifying aesthetic experience. He agreed that “certain modes of engaging artworks - such 
as commending a play because I own the copyright or because my daughter is in it - are 
apparently mistaken” (Carroll 2012, 166). However, he claimed that we may discount those 
mistaken modes of engaging artworks by saying that they are not focused on relevant 
properties, such as formal, expressive, and aesthetic properties, of works of art. He 
considered the notion of attention to be more clear and useful than the notion of value for its 
own sake. Here, the notion of attention refers to audience’s mental state during their 
appreciation, whereas the notion of value for its own sake refers merely to audience’s mental 
beliefs (motivations) before their appreciation. Therefore, only the notion of attention 
 
76 
matters in identifying correct modes of engaging artworks, and proponents of the axiological 
approach have confused the two very different notions.  
 
However, the claim that motivation does not matter in identifying aesthetic experience is 
questionable. Carroll seemed to put a sharp distinction between the motivation of 
appreciation and the process of appreciation. It seems theoretically plausible in the first 
place, since those two notions are logically distinguishable from each other. However, it is 
not clear that those two notions are still sharply distinguishable during the actual practice of 
appreciation. Specifically, our motivation may affect our attention when appreciating works 
of art.34 It seems practically implausible to say that one can stay focused and attend to 
properties of works of art if the person is exclusively interested in beneficial consequences 
that the experience may bring. For example, a person who listens to a play merely due to the 
motivation of impressing his partner may easily be distracted by his romantic imagination.35 
He cannot help but imagine that his partner will adore and highly praise him for his 
knowledge. In this situation, his attention has shifted from appreciating the work to 
imagining the beneficial consequences. He cannot stay focused and attend to the formal, 
expressive, and aesthetic properties of the work. As Carroll himself noted, aesthetic 
properties are often subtle (Carroll 1999), and it seems implausible to hold that the person 
may still be awarded for them. Therefore, the distinction between the motivation of 
appreciation and the process of appreciation is not always a sharp one in the practical point 
of view. One may notice that the above response focuses on the practical consideration and 
ignore the theoretical consideration. This is because our capability of having experience is 
partly based on our actual mental capabilities. Therefore, it is useful to refer to actual 
examples and psychological discoveries, since we may not want to develop an account of 
aesthetic experience that is clearly out of our actual mental capabilities.  
 
  
                                               
34 One may refer to “The monkey business illusion”, a psychological experiment conducted 
by Daniel J. Simons in 2010. Simons showed subjects a video and asked those subjects to 
count how many times people in the video have passed a ball. During the process, a gorilla 
walked into the centre of the screen and faced the camera for nine seconds. Surprisingly, half 
of the subjects failed to notice the gorilla that appeared in the video.  
35 It is possible that people with different motivations may have same type of experience. I 
only intend to show that motivation may affect our degree of attention when we are 




2. Problems Arising from the Practices of Conceptual Arts 
In this section, I consider a possible problem of the new aestheticism that has arisen in the 
contemporary period and is related to practices of some modern arts, such as conceptual arts 
or avant-garde arts: can works of art be purely conceptual entities instead of physical 
entities?  
 
2.1. The Anti-Perceptual Claim 
Before responding to the problem that have arisen from the practices of conceptual arts, it is 
helpful to briefly introduce the problem. According to James Shelley, the problem stems 
from three jointly inconsistent but independently plausible propositions:  
 
“(R) Artworks necessarily have aesthetic properties that are relevant to their appreciation as 
artworks.  
(S)  Aesthetic properties necessarily depend, at least in part, on properties perceived by 
means of the five senses. 
(X) There exist artworks that need not be perceived by means of the five senses to be 
appreciated as artworks” (Shelley 2003, 364).  
 
Shelley named the problem “the problem of non-perceptual art”, and philosophers attempt to 
solve this problem by rejecting one of the three propositions. Some philosophers, for 
example, Binkley and Carroll, tend to reject (R), but their rejection troubles proponents of 
aesthetic definitions, since the rejection breaks the close relation between works of art and 
the aesthetic. However, the rejection of (R) does not affect Iseminger’s new aestheticism 
immediately, because of two reasons. First, Iseminger did not hold the close relation between 
works of art and the aesthetic. He merely held that “the function of the artworld and practice 
of art is to promote aesthetic communication” (Iseminger 2004, 23). Second, Iseminger did 
not appeal to the notion of aesthetic property in his explanation of appreciation. Rather, he 
claimed that appreciation is “finding the experience of a state of affairs to be valuable in 
itself” (Iseminger 2004, 36). Iseminger seemed to stress on experience rather than property 
in explaning the notion of aesthetic, since he believed that the explanation of the aesthetic 
state of mind helps us “break into aesthetic space” (Iseminger 2004, 36). However, I think 
that the above problem may still bring potential challenge on Iseminger’s new aestheticism. 
 
Even though Iseminger merely held the close relation between artworlds and practices of art, 
one may doubt whether his new aestheticism is able to account for the conceptual artworld 
and conceptual practice of art. This is because the function of the conceptual artworld and 
conceptual practice of art is to promote communication that does not necessarily require the 
use of the five senses to perceive. The conceptual artworld and conceptual practice of art is 
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an artifact created by Duchamp and maintained by him and other conceptual artists, with an 
aim to promote artworks that do not have to be perceived by means of the five senses to be 
appreciated as artworks. Moreover, it is quite obvious that the conceptual artworld and 
conceptual practice of art is good enough at doing so, and is doing it better than other 
competitors. Therefore, we may make the following conclusion: 
 
(X’) There exist artworlds and practices of art that function to promote communications that 
need not be perceived by means of the five senses. 
 
The above conclusion causes problem to Iseminger’s new aestheticism, since one may 
wonder how an aesthetic definition would account for something that needs not be perceived 
by means of the five senses. I think that Iseminger attempted to avoid this problem by 
rejecting proposition (S). 
 
As discussed before, Iseminger stressed on experience rather than property when explaining 
the notion of aesthetic. However, this does not mean that Iseminger had totally ignored the 
role of property in aesthetic communications. I argue that the effect of being appreciated 
emerges from the appearance of certain properties of artifacts. Iseminger defined aesthetic 
appreciation as “finding the experiencing of a state of affairs to be valuable in itself” 
(Iseminger 2004, 36), and he explained a state of affairs as “something having a property - 
rather than a thing or property” (Iseminger 2004, 36). Therefore, what is appreciated is a 
property of something, but not the thing of the property simpliciter. As Iseminger pointed out 
“in the first instance someone appreciates a spheroid’s being graceful (the gracefulness of 
the spheroid, that the spheroid is graceful) rather than the spheroid or gracefulness 
simpliciter” (Iseminger 2004, 36). Therefore, saying that someone appreciates an artifact is 
to say that (A1) the person experiences certain properties of the artifact, and (A2) the person 
finds that the experiencing is valuable in itself. Based on this, we may make the following 
conclusion: 
 
(A) Aesthetic appreciation depends, at least in part, on a person’s experiencing of certain 
properties of an artifact.  
 
Further, Iseminger claimed that “experiencing a state of affairs is a matter of having direct 
(noninferential but not necessarily infallible) knowledge that that state of affairs obtains” 
(Iseminger 2004, 36). More importantly, he mentioned that “experiencing thus may (but 
need not) be a sensory matter” (Iseminger 2004, 37), and that it can also “involve[s] 
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conceptual capacities and may depend on prior knowledge” (Iseminger 2004, 37). It seems 
that Iseminger believed that experiencing can be a non-sensory matter. That is to say, a 
person may experience a property of an artifact by means other than the five senses. 
Therefore, we may make the following conclusion:  
 
(E) Properties that involve in an experiencing need not be perceived by means of the five 
senses.  
 
Since aesthetic appreciation depends partly on an experiencing, we may combine (A) and (E) 
and draw the following conclusion: 
 
(A’) Aesthetic appreciation may depend on properties that are perceived by means other than 
the five senses. 
 
That is to say: 
 
(P) Properties that involve in an aesthetic appreciation do not necessarily need to be 
perceived by means of the five senses. 
 
It is not clear that Iseminger refereed to aesthetic properties in his discussion of the notion of 
aesthetic appreciation and the notion of experiencing. In the discussion of his notion of 
experiencing, Iseminger took experiencing the gracefulness of a spheroid as an example of 
experiencing a state of affairs, and gracefulness is considered a characteristically aesthetic 
property. Yet, he did not use the term “aesthetic property” in his discussion. Iseminger 
probably wanted to avoid a step back situation, since the clause “the experiencing of a state 
of affairs” is supposed to define the notion of aesthetic appreciation. If Iseminger defined the 
clause “experiencing of a state of affairs” as “experiencing of an aesthetic property of an 
artifact”, he would have to further define the notion of aesthetic property, since the task of 
Iseminger is “breaking into aesthetic space”. But I think that Iseminger actually referred to 
aesthetic properties in his discussion of his notion of aesthetic appreciation and his notion of 
experiencing. First, Iseminger used the gracefulness of a spheroid, which is considered a 
characteristically aesthetic property, as an example in his discussion. Second, experiencing 
aesthetic properties is different from experiencing non-aesthetic properties, even though 
aesthetic properties emerge from non-aesthetic properties (Sibley 1965). For instance, 
experiencing or seeing the whiteness of a spheroid is different from experiencing or seeing 




Therefore, I think it is reasonable to claim that Iseminger’s new aestheticism implies the 
following proposition: 
 
(P’) Aesthetic properties that are involved in an aesthetic appreciation do not necessarily 
need to be perceived by means of the five senses. 
 
The next step is to find out the relation between aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic 
properties in Iseminger’s new aestheticism. I refer to Iseminger’s discussion of Duchamp’s 
readymades in explaining their relation. Iseminger thinks that Duchamp ‘does not propose 
them [readymades] as objects affording visual appreciation’ (Iseminger 2004, 57) and ‘it is 
hard to take him as seriously proposing them [readymades] as objects of aural appreciation 
(Iseminger 2004, 57). Then how should we appreciate Duchamp’s readymades? Iseminger 
provided his answer: 
 
“An alternative worth exploring is that such works, though not to be appreciated by looking 
at them or by listening to how they sound, are to be appreciated as certain works of literature 
are, by understanding what they say and finding value in grasping what they say as presented 
in the way they say it……by understanding them and valuing the experience of 
understanding what they say as embodied in the arrangement of words with which they say 
it……” (Iseminger 2004, 57). 
 
Aesthetic properties that involve in appreciating Duchamp’s readymades, for instance 
appreciating the impishness and humour of Duchamp’s readymades, depend on 
understanding what they say. This is to say that the impishness and humour of Duchamp’s 
readymades depend on the semantic properties (what they say) of readymades. Therefore, I 
think it is reasonable to claim that Iseminger would agree that at least some aesthetic 
properties depend on semantic properties of artworks. And semantic properties need not to 
be perceived by the means of the five senses. We have to read (look at) a sentence or listen 
to a song in order to understand the meaning of the sentence or the song, however, they are 
different with looking at the shape of a picture or listening to the tone of a song. Therefore, I 
think it is reasonable to claim that Iseminger’s new aestheticism implies proposition (D): 
 
(D) Some aesthetic properties do not depend on properties perceived by means of the five 
senses. 
 




(S’) Aesthetic properties do not necessarily depend on properties perceived by means of the 
five senses. 
 
With the rejection of the proposition (S), Iseminger’s new aestheticism is able to account for 
the conceptual artworld and practice of conceptual art, which function to promote 
communication that need not be perceived by means of the five senses. The cost for this 
rejection, though, is the separation from the aesthetic tradition. As Shelley mentioned in his 
paper, Binkley and Carroll both offered historical narratives and argued that at least some 
version of the proposition (S) is maintained by a number of notable aestheticians (Shelley 
2003). Binkley “asserts a logical relation between Sibley’s view and the view that aesthetic 
properties depend on sensory properties” (Shelley 2003, 371), since Sibley believed that “it 
is important to note first that, broadly speaking, aesthetics deals with a kind of perception. 
People have to see the grace and unity of a work, hear the plaintiveness or frenzy in the 
music, notice the gaudiness of a color scheme, feel the power of a novel, its mood, or its 
uncertainty of tone… the crucial thing is to see, hear, or feel. To suppose that one can make 
aesthetic judgments without aesthetic perception… is to misunderstand aesthetic judgment” 
(Sibley 1965, 34). Thus, Binkley concluded that Sibley’s view is that aesthetic properties 
“inhere in what Monroe Beardsley has called ‘the perceptual object’: ‘A perceptual object is 
an object some of whose qualities, at least, are open to direct sensory awareness (Beardsley 
1981, 31)’” (Binkley 1970, 268), and he considered this a version of the proposition (S). On 
the other hand, Carroll claimed that Hutcheson’s argument in Inquiry Concerning Beauty, 
Order, Harmony, Design constitutes the “banishing [of] knowledge from the experience of 
beauty” (Carroll 1991, 316), which is “a momentous event in the history of philosophical 
aesthetics” (Shelley 2003, 375). Carroll proposed that Hutcheson “wants to contrast the 
feeling of beauty with knowledge, a contrast that portends subsequent contrasts, within the 
tradition, between the aesthetic and the cognitive” (Carroll 1991, 313), since Hutcheson 
mentioned that the pleasure of beauty “does not arise from any knowledge of principles, 
proportions, cause or of the usefulness of the object, but strikes us first with the idea if 
beauty” (Hutcheson 1973, §I, art. XII). Thus, Carroll suggested that the only thing that 
remains in the realm of the aesthetic is “the look or sound or pattern of thing[s]” (Carroll 
1991, 314). According to the above narratives, one may reasonably question that Iseminger’s 
definition is actually not an aesthetic one. 
 
However, it is doubtful that Binkley and Carroll’s narratives are correct. Shelley argued that 
Binkley and Carroll had wrongly interpreted the understanding of aesthetic properties of 
those notable aestheticians, for instance, Sibley and Hutcheson (Shelley 2003). He claimed 
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that Sibley and Hutcheson did not maintain any version of proposition (S), and therefore, 
proposition (S) should be rejected in order to solve “the problem of non-perceptual art”.  
 
In the following, I will summarize Shelley’s discussion on Sibley and Hutcheson view on 
aesthetic properties separately. Shelley proposed that, in saying that perceiving something’s 
quality is necessary for making aesthetic judgments, Sibley actually used a broad notion of 
perceiving: Sibley “means merely that we do not infer them (aesthetic properties), but that 
they strike us” (Shelley 2003, 372). Shelley referred to Sibley’s original passage to support 
his claim. In clarifying the nature of aesthetic judgment, Sibley mentioned that “rather as a 
color-blind man may infer that something is green without seeing that it is, and rather as a 
man, without seeing a joke himself, may say something is funny because others laugh, so 
someone may attribute balance or gaudiness to a painting, or say that it is too pale, without 
himself having judged it so” (Sibley 1965, 137). Sibley’s main point here is to exclude 
inferring as a mean of making aesthetic judgments. Thus, Sibley’s view on aesthetic 
properties is different from Beardsley’s, since Beardsley believed that “the properties on 
which aesthetic properties depend” are “essentially perceptible by means of the five senses” 
(Shelley 2003, 373), where properties such as daring, impudence, and wit are also as 
aesthetic as grace, elegance, and beauty. Shelley further argued that his understanding is 
more preferable, since it is able to explain why literary works are usually considered 
aesthetic. Specifically, aesthetic properties of literary works do not depend directly on 
properties perceived by means of the five senses. Shelley further claimed that “Hutcheson 
does not exclude the cognitive from the aesthetic” (Shelley 2003, 376). Although Hutcheson 
mentioned that the idea of beauty is an “internal” or “mental” sensation, which is not 
identical to “external” or “bodily” sensations received by means of the five senses. Shelley 
referred to Hutcheson’s arguments to support his understanding of Hutcheson’s view: 
Hutcheson observed that “we sometimes find ourselves struck by the beauty of powerful yet 
economical ‘theorems’ or ‘demonstrated universal truths’, such as propositions of Euclid’s 
geometry or Newton’s gravitational principle (Hutcheson 1973, §I, art. XI; §III, arts I, II, 
V.)”, and “he devotes an entire section of his Inquiry to its (the fact of our finding beauty in 
theorems) discussion” (Shelley 2003, 376). Therefore, Hutcheson believed that “not all 
objects of beauty are objects of external sense” (Shelley 2003, 376). In claiming that the 
pleasure of beauty is sensible, immediate, as opposed to rational, Hutcheson’s point is that 
“we do not reason our way to the experience of beauty ‘from any knowledge of principles, 
proportions, causes or of the usefulness of the object’, but that that experience, rather, strikes 
us, and so is sensible as opposed to rational” (Shelley 2003, 376). This is merely to say that 
knowledge cannot be the means to an experience of beauty, but this does not mean that 
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knowledge cannot be the object of such an experience. Therefore, principles or other 
cognitive entities can still strike one with their beauty. Thus, Shelley concluded that it is 
reasonable for us to reject proposition (S) and thereby solving “the problem of non-
perceptual art”. It is theoretically possible for an aesthetic definition to account for non-
perceptual art. 
 
According to Shelley’s argument, an aesthetic definition is able to account for conceptual 
art, which is considered a major form of non-perceptual art. In addition, both neo-Lewisian 
notion of value-apprehension and Iseminger’s new aestheticism consider non-perceptual art 
as a proper form of art. As I argued in Section 5, neo-Lewisian notion of value-apprehension 
encompasses semantic and expressive properties, as well as other perceptual properties, as 
aesthetically relevant properties. Thus, it is theoretically possible to account for the 
appreciation of concepts or ideas. Also, Iseminger claimed that appreciations of concept arts 
are somehow similar to appreciations of works of literature, which are to be appreciated by 
“understanding what they say and finding value in grasping what they say as presented in the 
way they say it” (Iseminger 2004, 57). 
 
However, there is still one remaining question, namely, the necessity of experiencing in 
appreciating conceptual arts. Some philosophers, for instance, Carroll, argued that 
experiencing is not necessarily in appreciating some artworks. Carroll claimed that “some 
art, like Duchamp’s Fountain, are idea based, rather than experience based. One can derive 
satisfaction from thinking about Fountain without even experiencing… one can read about it 
and think about it without knowing exactly it looked like in terms of its form and its 
perceptible properties” (Carroll 1999, 180-181). It is not clear why Carroll did not view 
“read about it and think about it” as experiencing, since processes of reading and thinking of 
objects can be considered so. Moreover, experiencing may involve properties other than 
perceptual properties that are perceived by means of the five senses. For example, semantic 
properties may also be involved in experiencing works of literature. Perhaps Carroll’s claim 
here is that one can appreciate Fountain simply from others’ descriptions, for instance, 
reading others descriptions of it instead of seeing it. If this was the case, then both 
Iseminger’s and the neo-Lewisian proposals would fail, because both require experiencing. 
Such a claim is questionable, though. For instance, Elisabeth Schellekens proposed that 
conceptual arts do not afford propositional knowledge. Instead, they afford experiential 
knowledge to audience. In her paper “The Aesthetic Value of Ideas”, she attempted to show 
that appreciating conceptual arts involves not merely having propositional knowledge, but 
also experiential knowledge, of those works. Although material entities are not objects of 
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appreciations, direct experiencing is still necessary in appreciations. Conceptual arts do not 
merely express ideas or deliver knowledge to appreciators, they “breath[e] life into idea it 
seeks to represent by making is grasp the idea phenomenologically” (Schellekens 2007, 83). 
The material parts of conceptual works “trigger the imaginative exercise that can eventually 
lead to the experiential knowledge” (Schellekens 2007, 83). Therefore, appreciations of 
conceptual works involve not merely the ideas presented by a conceptual work, but also the 
question of how those ideas are presented by the conceptual work. An answer to the latter 
question involves a process of experiencing.  
 
I attempt to take Duchamp’s Fountain, which is considered to be a famous and influential 
piece of conceptual work, as an example to illustrate this point. In presenting Fountain to the 
audience, Duchamp intended to shift the focus of appreciation from physical entities to 
intellectual entities. Does this imply that experiencing is no longer necessary in 
appreciation? My answer is no. A porcelain urinal can be well designed. One may craft on it 
and decorate it with aesthetically pleasurable pattern. If Fountain is made from a porcelain 
urinal that is well decorated or designed, then Duchamp’s intention may probably fail, since 
one may still focus on the physical part of Fountain. In making or choosing Fountain, 
Duchamp knew and expected that others will find that the perceptible properties of Fountain 
that he had chosen have no aesthetic value. One can find the values of Fountain only if one 
knows the idea involved in Fountain. In this situation, experiencing is still required for 
appreciation, otherwise one may not truly know or understand Duchamp’s idea, since his 
idea partly depends on the fact that one cannot find any value in merely experiencing the 
perceptible properties of Fountain. One can only be stroke by this fact through his/her 
experiencing. Therefore, at least a certain degree of appropriate experiencing, which would 
be seeing in the case of appreciating Fountain, is necessary. Moreover, the way that 
Duchamp presented Fountain is also relevant for appreciation of the work. For instance, 
knowing that Duchamp presented Fountain in an exhibition of the Society of Independent 
Artists, instead of other non-art exhibition, is relevant for appreciating the work as daring, 







In this thesis, I proposed my ideas for revising Iseminger’s new aestheticism by replacing the 
notion of appreciation with Lewisian’s notion of value-apprehension. This chapter is a 
review of some of the key points in my proposal. 
 
The thesis started with a review of some contemporary difficulties in and attempts on 
defining the concept of art. The difficulties that arise from the appearances of Duchamp’s 
Fountain and Weitz’s open concept argument were introduced in section 1. This is followed 
by a critical discussion on some contemporary attempts in defining art, including the 
institutional conventionalism, historical conventionalism, and the functionalism in section 2. 
Stecker’s view on the project on defining art and Davies’ disjunctive definition of art were 
also considered. 
 
In Part 2, I narrowed down my consideration to the aesthetic theories of art and defended 
Iseminger’s new aestheticism. Section 1 is a summary of Iseminger’s idea of new 
aestheticism, including both its functional thesis and valuational thesis. Iseminger’s notion of 
appreciation was also investigated, which helped to distinguish the aesthetic and non-
aesthetic state of mind. Finally, I proposed a possible problem with Iseminger’s notion of 
appreciation.  Section 2 started with a review of the Lewisian notion of value-apprehension, 
which can be divided into a broad notion and a narrow notion. This is followed by an 
introduction of Livingston’s discussions and revisions on Lewis’ narrow notion of value-
apprehension. In Section 3, I argued that Livingston’s revised notion of value-apprehension 
is not only able to circumvent the problems in Iseminger’s notion of appreciation and 
provide extra advantages, but also fits well into Iseminger’s new aestheticism.  
 
In Part 3, I considered some objections that were raised against the Lewisian notion of value-
apprehension and my proposal. In section 1, I examined Carroll’s objections against the 
axiological approach in defining aesthetic experience, and answered his queries in four 
aspects: 1) the objection of inadequacy; 2) the objection of emptiness; 3) the objection of 
evolutionary point of view; and 4) the objection of type-identical experience. Section 2 is a 
discussion on some problems that arise from practices of conceptual arts. I particularly 
investigated the anti-perceptual claim, which may cause potential problems on the proposal 
of new aestheticism, and argued that the actual practices of conceptual arts would render the 
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